[Vol.108

RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-n-ITAI

CoNvIcTIOx

SUSTainED

AGAImST CONTENTION TH:AT TWENTY-WEEKc DOCKET DELAY BEYOND INrrT Y ASSIGNED Tit-a DATE VIOLATED SIXTH Am nmMENT RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL

Thirty weeks subsequent to his involvement in a poolroom stabbing
and twenty weeks subsequent to the originally assigned trial date, defendant was tried and convicted of assault with a deadly weapon.1 The latter
twenty-week interval, throughout which defendant remained incarcerated
for failure to post bail, was consumed by a series of continuances, 2 several
upon defendant's motion but the major number-accounting for eighty
of the hundred and forty days delay-resulting from the crowded criminal
docket 3 of the District of Columbia district court. Prevailing at that time
was a calendar assignment scheme whereby the assigning commissioner, 4
to assure the maximum possible utilization of court and jury hours, systematically set for each trial day more cases than could probably be heard;
I The offense occurred October 27, 1956. Defendant was arrested and charged
November 6 and was unable to put up bail; he was indicted December 3 and had
defense counsel appointed by the court December 7, on which date he was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. Trial was set for January 14, 1957. King v. United States,
265 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1959), Joint Appendix, pp. 1, 6, 11 [hereinafter cited as
Appendix].
2 The docket registers seven continuances: from January 14 to January 28 (on
motion of defendant), January 28 to February 27 (no court available), February 27
to March 20 (no court available), March 20 to March 21 (no court available),
March 21 to April 15 (defendant's attorney ill), April 15 to May 13 (no court
available), May 9 to June 3 (referred for appointment of counsel). Defendant filed
a "motion for direct acquittal" April 26 which was heard and denied May 3; again,
on May 3 defendant moved the court to appoint new defense counsel, which the court
did on May 9, at the same time granting a continuance to permit the new counsel
to familiarize himself with the case. Appendix, pp. 2, 3, 6.
3 On January 1, 1957, there were 285 cases marked available for trial on the
criminal calendar of the district court. Between that date and July 31, 1957-the
period during which the delay in the instant case accumulated-705 new indictments
were returned in the court and 765 cases were disposed of, 262 by trial. Marked
available for trial on the criminal calendar on February 1 were 247 cases; March 1,
319 cases; April 1, 261 cases; May 1, 247 cases; June 1, 248 cases; July 1, 239 cases;
August 1, 263 cases. United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
Office of the Assignment Commissioner, Status of the Criminal Calendar, 1957. During this period, of the fourteen judges of the district court, three were assigned exclusively to criminal trials, two more were assigned to hear motions, and the assignment judge was also assigned to try criminal and civil cases "as exigencies require."
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Orders, Dec. 18, 1956,
March 25, 1957.
4 As a matter of practice in most districts the assignment of criminal cases for
trial is handled by the United States Attorney. FED. R. CiM. P. 50, Advisory
Comm. Note. See generally Holtzoff, Streamlining Litigation in UNIVERSrrY OF
CHIcAGo LAW SCHOOL, CONFERENCE ON JutmcrA. ADmiNiSTRAION 56, 58-60 (1956).
In the District Court for the District of Columbia since 1945 assignment has been
made by the Assignment Commissioner of the Court, under the supervision of the
Assignment Judge. See District Court of the District of Columbia, Report to the
Members of the Judicial Conference of the Judges in the District, June 1, 1947.
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cases not reached on their scheduled day were typed "no court available"
and automatically continued to the next available date at the end of the trial
list, usually three or four weeks later.5 After three such continuances, and
at a time some fifteen weeks after the originally fixed trial date, defendant
filed a motion for acquittal urging, inter alia, that the successive trial deferments had deprived him of his sixth amendment right to speedy trial. The
motion was denied and the case proceeded to trial where defendant renewed
his objections. On appeal from conviction, the circuit court en banc
affirmed, 7 holding that the manner in which the trial court's calendar was
handled so reasonably accommodated practical exigencies as to make the
delay of defendant's trial unobjectionable in law. King v. United States,
265 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998 (1959).
5 The problem with which the district court's calendar scheme was intended to
cope may be briefly sketched: Cases cannot be simply run through trial one by one
in line as they are reached, in the fashion of a box-office queue, since this would
require the obviously impracticable continued attendance in court of defendants,
prosecuting and defense counsel and witnesses in virtually every pending case.
Rather, a case must be set for trial for some relatively certain date, and set sufficiently
ahead of time to give adequate notice to all persons involved to plan for the event.
Since it is impossible to foresee the length of each trial scheduled, or the number
of cases set for trial which will in fact not be tried on the fixed day due to guilty
pleas, continuances, etc., the alternative is posed of listing for trial for any given day
(1) a number of cases such that it will probably be possible to try them all (in
which event, perhaps half of the time, a more rapid pace of trials than is anticipated
will leave judges and juries waiting with no cases to try), or (2) a greater number
of cases than will probably be reached (in which event there will be a number of
cases on each trial day which will find no court available and will have to be
carried over). Where heavy backlogs exist, the second alternative-that adopted
by the district court-is the only feasible one. The problem, then, is what to do
with the cases not reached for trial. They may be carried over from day to day;
but this entails a progressive displacement of scheduled cases at short notice and to a
varying and unpredictable extent, and-by chain reaction-restores in large measure
the uncertainty of the simple queue-up system. Alternatively, the procedure used
at the time of the instant case may be adopted: the unreached case is reassigned for
the first trial day for which a full schedule of cases is not yet set. Thus the case
disturbs no already assigned cases but, because each such continuance is for the
full period for which the trial calendar is projected (in this case, assignments were
fixed three or four weeks in advance), and because a defendant may possibly suffer
several successive continuances, there exists a danger of substantial delay in the rare
case. A third scheme, which has in fact been inaugurated in the District of Columbia
since the time of the instant case and is now in effect, contemplates the placing of the
continued case on the docket for the next available trial date on which it may be
placed close enough to the head of that day's list to assure that it will actually be
tried on that day. "The term 'available trial date' contemplates not only the number
and character of cases already on the assignment for that new date but also other
commitments of both counsel and the availability of witnesses on the new date."
Letter from Melvin J. Marques, Administrative Assistant to the Chief Judge of
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Oct. 1, 1959, on file in Biddle Law Library [hereinafter
cited as Marques Letter]. While this may involve waiting several days longer on
the first reassignment than under the first-date-at-the-end-of-the-list system, more
than one "no court available" continuance is thus rendered extremely unlikely. Under
the new system the case backlog has in fact been reduced so that as of June 30, 1959,
there were only 140 criminal cases listed available for trial, 22 of which were awaiting
arraignment or actually being tried. A trial within three weeks of arraignment is
now possible. Ibid.
6 Actually four "no court available" continuances were ordered, but in only three
was reassignment made at the end of the trial calendar. A fourth was carried over
to the next day. See note 2 supra.
7Four judges dissented.
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Recognized as early as the Magna Charta,8 the right of an accused to
speedy trial is guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the federal constitution,9 as by the constitutions of the overwhelming majority of the states. 10
Unlike many of the states," however, there exists on the federal level no
explicit statutory mandate prescribing the length of time within which
trial must be brought, 12 and determination of violation of the right must be
made judicially on the circumstances of the particular case.' 3 Relevant
factors in those circumstances have been recognized: deliberate delay by
the prosecutorial authorities to serve their own tactical advantages 14 or
for purposes of vexation, 15 harm to an accused as the result of physical incarceration prior to a determination of guilt, 16 and hampering effects of the
8 C. 40. ADAMS & STEPHENS, SELECT DocUMENTs OF ENGLISH CONsTITuTIoNAl
HISTORY 47 (1901). For a resume of the historical development of the law of speedy
trial in England and the United States see United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183,
196-200 (D. Md.), aff'd mem., 350 U.S. 857 (1955).
9 "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial . . . ." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
0 All but five states have speedy trial provisions in their constitutions. Note, 57
COLUM. L. REv. 846, 847 n.7 (1957).
lId. at 852 n.35. While in the absence of statute courts have seemed to regard
it as impracticable to fix a definite time within which a criminal case must be tried
to avoid the constitutional proscription, Gordon v. Overlade, 143 F. Supp. 577, 580
(N.D. Ind. 1956), the many state statutes do just this, and delay beyond the proscribed time limits is usually regarded as per se requiring liberation of the accused.
Eg., Ware v. State, 159 Ark 540, 252 S.W. 934 (1923) ; Feger v. Fish, 106 Fla. 564,
143 So. 605 (1932) ; Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind. 175, 102 N.E.2d 203 (1951) ; State v.
Hess, 180 Kan. 472, 304 P.2d 474 (1956). Some maleability may be preserved within
the statutory framework, however, by the exception for good cause which some of
the provisions contain, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.04 (1947); N.Y. CODE CamM.
Poc. §§ 667-68; ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 134.110-120 (1955), and, to a lesser extent, by
explicit statutory exemption of cases in defined circumstances, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 62-1432 (1949); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 545.890, 545.900 (1953). In the federal
system, such definitive and uniform provision might of course be established by court
rule as well as by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1958), the former method seeming to
promise particular advantages of flexibility and empirical adaptability. See Levin &
Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Juicial Rule-Making: A Problem i; Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 11, 19-20 (1958). See generally ABA, THE
IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE 8-12 (1949) ; Note, 57 COLTM. L.
REv. 846, 855-57, 865 (1957).
12 FED. R. Cam!. P. 50 does provide: "The district courts may provide for placing criminal proceedings upon appropriate calendars. Preference shall be given to
criminal proceedings as far as practicable." The dissenting opinion in the instant
case, finding that "the substantial delay of appellant's trial violated Rule 50," instant
case at 572, seemed to regard that finding as decisive of the case. But, even apart
from the obviously extensive scope of discretion permitted by the "practicable"
clause, it must be noted that rule 50 is in form admonitory only, and provides no
sanction for its "violation." And although it might be reasonable to read into a
statute prescribing a fixed time within which trial must be had a command that the
accused not tried within that time must be released, no similar command need
logically be found in a court rule establishing a qualified principle of preference for
the purposes of a general docket-arrangement scheme.
'3 See, e.g., Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905); Taylor v. United States,
238 F.2d
259, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
34 United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd vzein., 350 U.S. 857

(1955).
15 Chinn v. United States, 228 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1955) (dictum) ; Shepherd v.
United States, 163 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1947) (dictum) ; cf. Pollard v. United States,
352 U.S. 354 (1956) (dictum). See generally HELLER. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 139-40 (1951).
16Uited States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), affd mere., 350 U.S. 857
(1955).
Although there are too few cases on the point to establish whether the
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passage of time upon the abilities of the accused to prepare and to prove
his defense 1 7 have been invoked as elements which may make prolonged
postponement of a trial unlawful.' 8 Similarly, in the individual fact com-

plex of an accused's situation, waiver may be found,' 9 predicated in some
instances upon affirihative acts aggravative of delay,20 in others merely

upon acquiescence in a series of postponements; 21 but where the accused
does not know of his indictment 22 or could not reasonably be expected to
take affirmative steps to speed up trial,23 the right is held not waived.
In looking to concrete circumstances, moreover, the courts have shown a

tendency to leave considerable leeway for the needs of "the practical administration of justice" :24 in McDonald v. Hudseth,2 5 where the defendcircumstance of incarceration pending trial is an isolably significant one, language
in several opinions appears to suggest that "speedy" may have to be speedier for a
jailed than for a bailed accused. Thus, the majority in the instant case, suggesting
to the district court that it ought "give the problem continuing attention,' adds:
"especially in regard of defendants held in jail." Instant case at 569. See also
Worthington v. United States, 1 F.2d 154 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 626
(1924).
But compare the attitude of the District of Columbia district court:
"[T]here is no distinction between defendants admitted to bail and incarcerated
defendants so far as setting trial dates is concerned. In granting continuances however, the judges are more strict, with respect to showing, in cases where the defendant is incarcerated." Marques Letter. Several state statutes provide that defendants
not on bail shall receive preferential treatment as to scheduling trial, or that dismissal is to be granted for a shorter delay. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 748
(Smith-Hurd 1935); KAN. GrN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-1431 to -32 (1949); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 545.890-.900 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-8(6) (1953).
On the other
hand, federal cases may be discovered involving considerable delay in the trial of
accuseds provisionally jailed and which refuse to find a constitutional violation.
McDonald v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 984 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 683 (1940)
(10 months) ; O'Brien v. United States, 25 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1928) (13 months).
17Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1956); cf. United
States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230, 233 (N.D. Ill.1955).
18 These areas of concern appear to point up the discrete elements of the threefold rationale which has been said to underlie the sixth amendment right of speedy
trial: to protect the defendant from prolonged preliminary imprisonment, to relieve
him of the harassing anxiety and public suspicion attendant upon an untried accusation, and to insure that means of proving his innocence will be within his reach by
minimizing the possibility that witnesses will be unavailable or that their memories
will become dulled. See United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 198, 203 (D. Md.),
aff'd went., 350 U.S. 857 (1955); Commonwealth v. Hanley, 337 Mass. 384, 149
N.E.2d 608, 610, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958) ; People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353,
356, 130 N.E.2d 891, 893 (1955).
19 See, e.g., Levine v. United States, 182 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1950); United
States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Pietch v. United States, 110 F.2d
817 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 648 (1940); Worthington v. United States,
1 F.2d 154 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 626 (1924). See also Note, 64 YA=E L.J.
1208, 1210 (1955).
20 Shepherd v. United States, 163 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1947) (accused skipped

bail).2 1

See, e.g., Fouts v. United States, 253 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.), rehearhkq with additional finding of fact, 258 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 884 (1958);
United
States v. Alagia, 17 F.R.D. 15 (D. Del. 1955).
22
Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
23 Cf. United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
24Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 86 (1905).
See Kyle v. United States,
211 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1954). Of course in many cases the prosecution as well as the
defense may be hampered in the presentation of its case by the passage of time.
See Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 264 (1922).
25 113 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 683 (1940).
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ant remained in jail from June until January because there was no jury
during part of the summer, only one judge on the criminal bench, and prior
criminal cases to be tried including one which lasted from October through
December, and in Chinn v. United States, 26 where a ten-month delay was
occasioned in part by the appointment of a new judge and, apparently, in
part by ordinary calendar pressures, no sixth amendment violation was
found, inasmuch as defendants were tried "as soon as the orderly conduct
of the business of the court permitted." 27
But regardless of whether delay is so great as to infringe the constitutional stricture,28 there remains the question of what is the appropriate
remedy for vindication of the guarantee of speedy trial. That deprivation
of a constitutional right does not always entitle the deprived individual to
2 9
a particular desired constitutional remedy has been frequently recognized;
and particularly with regard to the right of speedy trial, it has been judicially observed that "neither Constitution, statutes, nor decisions indicate
any rule for determining when or how the right is invaded, nor the manner
of its vindication.'- 80 In fact, some of the early cases upon which the
doctrine of waiver has subsequently been predicated 3 ' may alternatively,
and more plausibly, be read as saying that the right to speedy trial is
precisely that-the right to be prosecuted before the courts within a reasonable time, not to be wholly immunized from criminal responsibility if one
is not so prosecuted.8 2 And indeed, in view of the prejudice to the public
interest which is entailed in releasing criminal offenders altogether on
grounds of irregularities in the method of their prosecution,83 there is
cogency in the argument that "error in the course of a prosecution resulting in conviction calls for the correction of the error, not the release of the
accused." 84 Nevertheless, insofar as the reasoning of the older cases,
premised upon the absence of statutory authority for release of a too-long
untried accused, has been undercut in part by federal rule 48(b), and
26228 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1955).
27

28

1d. at 153.

See 113 F2d at 986.

For examples of what is and is not good cause for purposes of exempting
delay from a statutory standard see 5 UTAH L. REv. 403, 404 & nn.9 & 10 (1957).
29 Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949) (search and seizure). See 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1053, 1058-60 (1959),
discussing the implications of Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
80 O'Brien v. United States, 25 F.2d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1928).
81
For cases holding that "the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial . . . is
waived by the accused's failure to demand trial," United States v. Patrisso, 21 F.R.D.
363, 8365
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), see notes 19-21 supra.
32 McDonald v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1940) ; Frankel v. Woodrough,
7 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1925). Cf. Fowler v. Hunter, 164 F.24 668, 670 (10th Cir.
1947); Shepherd v. United States, 163 F.2d 974, 977-78 (8th Cir. 1947). These
cases assert that the remedy of the accused, where a district court unconstitutionally
denies speedy trial, is to secure mandamus to force his case before the court.
88
This, of course, assumes that the accused is guilty. The problem with this
analysis is, in some cases, that prolonged delay may make impossible a fair and
sufficiently sure determination of the very fact of. guilt. See text accompanying
notes 60-66 infra.
84 Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 362 (1957). See Note, 5 STAir. L. REv.
95, 99 (1952).
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since a number of recent cases have ordered unconditional release of an
accused on grounds of undue delay in proceeding to trial, it becomes appropriate to assess precisely what remedy the Constitution may extend for
violation of this sixth amendment right. It will be found that such an
investigation of remedy is essential for analysis of the fact of violation
itself; whether an accused has been deprived of a speedy trial turns upon
the question: speedy for what purpose? The instant case poses the issues
of remedy and violation squarely, inasmuch as the majority opinion does
not apply the waiver principle that has been the ratio decidendi of virtually
all of the earlier federal decisions and, indeed, it would seem difficult to
invoke a waiver argument against defendant. At no time subsequent to the
initial continuance was defendant's trial assignment more than a month
away; 35 his failure to move for speedy trial may well be excused by his
legitimate expectancy that at any given moment he was in fact en route to
receiving one.
Four cases have released the accused for over-long delay: Provoo,3 6
Chase,37 McWilliams3 8 and Taylor.3 9 As to the first three of these, in all
40
of which district courts granted motions for dismissal under rule 48(b),
doubt may be raised as to whether they represent constitutional holdings.
The rule, which provides that "if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a
defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the indictment," clearly permits
release of an accused for lesser cause-for slighter delay-than that involved
where the sixth amendment demands release, for of course if the standard
is that of constitutional mandate, then the discretionary "may" of the rule
becomes absurd and meaningless. 41 It is unlikely that the draftsmen
3

3

5 See note 2

supra.

6United States v. Provoo, 17 F.RD. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd mer., 350 U.S. 857
(1955).
3
7 United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
38
United States v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
3
9 Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
40
FED. R. CRim. P. 48(b): "If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the
charge to a grand jury or in filing an information against a defendant who has
been held to answer to the district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing
a defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint."
41 Query whether 48(b) would have helped defendant in the instant case even
if the delay caused by calendar clogs had been more extensive than it was. Although
the language "unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial" may seem broad
enough on its face to cover court-caused as well as prosecutor-caused pre-trial prolongment, and the minority opinion suggests the applicability of the rule (instant case
at 573), principles of construction ejusdem generis would seem to militate for
availability of 48(b) dismissal only in the event of delay attributable to dilatory
prosecution. The advisory committee note that "this rule is a restatement of the
inherent power of the court to dismiss a case for want of prosecution," supports this
interpretation, as does language in all of the 48(b) dismissal cases. See note 51 infra
and accompanying text. To the extent that 48(b) is intended as an instrument
for court policing of prosecutorial activity, it seems particularly inappropriate where
the source of delay is within the power of the court to reach by other means.
Compare United States v. Patrisso, 21 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (refusing 48(b)
motion to dismiss but ordering prompt assignment for trial), with United States v.
Kovacs, 150 F. Supp. 301 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) (granting dismissal on condition defendant is not brought to trial by a certain date).
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intended to vest the trial court with discretion 42 the whole extent of whose
exercise consisted in the ability to put a defendant through the inconvenience
of a trial where conviction, if any, must be set aside on appeal. 4 3 Nevertheless, whether or not such a finding is necessary to their holdings,
Provoo,44 Chase 45 and McWilliams48 do purport to find a constitutional
deprivation, and Taylor, reversing a conviction and ordering dismissal of
the indictment, can be supported on none other than sixth amendment
grounds. Treating the four decision arguendo, then, as sixth amendment
cases, what principles do they support? Clearly, as a body, they are not
controlled by considerations of the unfairness to the accused of prolonged
physical incarceration prior to a judicial determination of guilt. Although
this factor is significant in Provoo, it is not even mentioned in the McWilliams opinions, and in Chase and Taylor defendants spent the whole of the
pre-trial period in prison for other offenses. Far more influential in the
decisions is sheer length of time elapsed: measured not from date of indictment but from date of occurrence of the alleged offense, 47 the lapses in the
cases ranged from five to twenty-one years. 48 In all four cases the crimes
charged were particularly grave; 4 9 in all, defendants had previously sought
to accelerate proceedings or had been in such circumstances as to excuse
42

The circuit court in Mc Williams applies the "clear abuse of discretion" test
in review of the trial judge's order of dismissal. 163 F.2d at 697.
43 The only concept which could reconcile the discretionary nature of rule 48(b)
with the theory that the standard for the exercise of that discretion is a violation
of the constitutional "right" of speedy trial is a hypostasis of "right!' which divorces
it from remedy by regarding 48(b) dismissal either as a means of making operable
a previously wholly unenforceable "right" or as a new remedial measure supplied
in vindication of a "right" previously enforceable only by other'means: viz.,
mandamus to secure immediate trial. To the extent that these concepts mean anything, they recognize that for purposes of acquittal the sixth amendment "right"
to speedy trial is non-existent-that is, that the amendment gives a right to trial
but no right to dismissal-and that rule 48(b) supplies a non-constitutional power
to dismiss. In United States v. Patrisso, 21 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where
motions to dismiss invoked both 48(b) and the Constitution, the court dearly treated
the two issues as discrete, although recognizing that the same considerations were
germane to both.
44 17 F.R.D. at 203.

45 135 F. Supp. at 233.
4669 F. Supp. at 814. Note, however, that Judge Laws' invocation of the sixth

amendment at 815 is merely analogical, and that the circuit court opinion, quoting
the latter but not the former reference, 163 F.2d at 696, makes no independent mention of the sixth amendment.
47
See especially Taylor, where indictment was not until more than three and
one-half years after the offense. The opinion stresses the amount of time elapsed
including this period, despite the fact that, if the statute of limitations means anything, it means that prosecution may be brought at any time within it without
prejudice. In Provoo, the offenses were alleged to have been committed in 1942
through 1945, a first indictment in a place of improper venue was returned in 1949,
and a second indictment in 1954. Dismissal was in 1955.
48
Provoo, ten to thirteen years; Chase, twenty-one years; McWilliams, at least
five years; Taylor, six years.
49

Provoo, treason; Chase, murder; McWilliams, subversive activities; Taylor,

housebreaking and robbery.
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their failure to do so; 5 in all, the major part of the delay was directly
attributable to dilatory tactics of the prosecution.5 1
The majority in the instant case seizes upon the last of these elements
as the point of distinction,52 contrasting prosecutorial procrastination with
delay incident to the misfiring of an otherwise reasonable and practicable
court calendar scheme. But although this line of analysis finds support
in authority, 53 and while it may be admitted that the trial-assignment
system of the district court was not, in view of the practical demands upon
it,54 unreasonable, there appear both conceptual problems and practical
dangers in the court's argument. First, it is not unlikely that the emphasis
on prosecution laxity in Provoo, Chase and McWilliams was determined
by the utilization in those cases of rule 48(b), which was designed primarily
to cope with the want-of-prosecution problem and, indeed, may be available
only for that purpose.5 5 Secondy, to find the system reasonable does not
decide the case, for the most reasonable systems may in the rare instance
yield unreasonable results, and where rectification of those results does not
require even partial obstruction of the system, it would seem that the
Constitution demands such rectification. Thirdly, in the case of practically
evitable harm to the individual, the extent of constitutional protection should
be measured by the nature and degree of that harm, not by its sourceand pre-trial delay, if prejudicial, is equally prejudicial whatever its cause.
But the greatest danger in the prosecutorial-laxity versus reasonable-courtcalendar distinction is its possible implication that in instances of delay
attributable to the latter no constitutional redress is available-that if defendant's pre-trial motion for acquittal had been instead a motion for
immediate trial the court could constitutionally have refused it and excused
the then-standing fifteen week delay 53 on grounds that the system as a
whole was reasonable. It is submitted that this result would be unconstitutional, and that a more meaningful rationale-and one more effectively
protective of the constitutional guarantee-would eschew the source-of-delay
line of discrimination and concentrate on the question of remedy. It has
been noted that there are within the concept of an unspeedy trial a number
5OProvoo, trial actually in progress in district of improper venue; Chase, defendant incarcerated in Alcatraz; McWilliams, after a first mistrial, defendants

several times moved for trial; Taylor, defendant did not know of indictment.
51Provoo, trial brought in district of collusive venue for tactical advantage;

Chase, prosecution twice struck indictment from docket without notice to defendant;
McWilliams, prosecution resisted court urgings to proceed over nine-month period;

Taylor,
indictment not brought for over three and one-half years.
52
]:nstant case at 569.
53
Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361-62 (1957) ; notes 25-27 supra.
5
4 See notes 3-5 supra.
55 See note 41 supra. It is not suggested that the district courts lack power to
dismiss where court-caused delay is involved, but only that that power does not
derive from 48(b). Taylor appears to place far less stress upon prosecutorial want
of diligence
as an independent argument.
56
As measured from the originally assigned trial date. Twenty-six weeks had
elapsed from the time of the alleged offense. See notes 1, 2 supra.
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of discrete elements of injury,57 and it is suggested that for different potential injuries, different remedies are appropriate. So long as the only harm
to the individual long awaiting trial is physical incarceration or the psychological pressures and social prejudices of untried accusation, the sixth
amendment gives him the right to demand a trial with the greatest dispatch
which is consistent, in his individual case, with the practical functioning of
the judicial machinery. So long as extreme delays (the measure of extremity being the length of time for which it is reasonable that society imprison or stigmatize an untried man) are the rare case, the Constitution
demands that the administrative machinery make room for them in its otherwise regular system; 58 when such delays become more frequent, the
Constitution may demand that the system itself be changed. But in no
such case does the Constitution prescribe dismissal: criminal immunity is
too dangerous a remedy for the guilty.59 Immunity becomes appropriate
only when it is no longer certain that it is only the guilty who are being
immunized-that is, when another element of harm enters the proceedings.
Where delay is so great that the accused is hampered-or may reasonably
be expected to be hampered 6O°-in the preparation and proof of his defense,
then (whatever the source of the delay, notwithstanding the exigencies of
administration, and irrespective of defendant's interim incarceration vel
non) continued prosecution becomes unconstitutional. In such a case, guilt
can no longer be established with the requisite certitude because with the
lapse of time there has supervened a considerable probability that the evidence adduced at trial will no longer represent with sufficient accuracy the
actual facts surrounding the alleged offense. This is in fact the ground
of Provoo, Chase, McWilliams and Taylor: all conclude that defendant
57
See note 18 supra.
5
8 The machinery for vindication of this right would be a motion for assignment
in the district court, see United States v. Patrisso, 21 F.R.D. 363, 366 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), and, failing in that, mandamus in the circuit court. Frankel v. Woodrough,
7 F2d 796 (8th Cir. 1925).
59 The unavailability of the dismissal remedy under this theory does not depend
upon the waiver principle. Even had defendant several times moved unsuccessfully
in the district court to accelerate trial, and were the court's denial of those motions
subsequently found, on appeal from conviction, to have been constitutionally improper,
conviction itself would not be assailable so long as no significant impairment of the
defense was involved. Defendant's remedy, if for example he had been confined
pre-trial for an over-long period, might be to have his sentence reduced by the
term of pre-trial confinement. Legislative authority for crediting such confinement
against sentence at the discretion of the court is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1958).
See, 6e.g., Eyler v. Aderhold, 73 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1934).
0 After significant periods of delay it would of course be unreasonable to expect
a defendant to prove that he is unable to prove his defense. On this reasoning Provoo
speaks of presuming prejudice after long delay, 17 F.R.D. at 203, although the court
goes on to find actual prejudice in the intervening deaths of at least three and
possibly as many as a dozen defense witnesses, and in the harmful psychological effects
on Provoo of a five-year pre-trial detention. The presumption language was subsequently echoed in dictum in United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958), and in Taylor and Chase prejudice seems in fact
to have been rather presumed than proved, the latter case even using the language
of judicial notice. 135 F. Supp. at 233. But while a presumption principle may be
reasonable in circumstances of extreme delay such as these cases involve (see note 48
supra; Lushnan also involved a seven-to-nine year period from offense to conviction),
it is to be doubted that the courts will attempt to apply it in cases involving such
considerably shorter periods as that in the instant case.
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"cannot have a fair trial at this late date," 61 that the time lapse "must
seriously have handicapped the preparation of a defense," 62 inasmuch as
witnesses, even if still "alive and within the jurisdiction . . . , would be
recalling something as in a dream, a kind of phantasmagoria." 63 Whether
the defense has been so handicapped is a question of fact in the individual
case, depending upon the character and nature of proof of the offense and
the defense offered to it,64 the events of the intervening period and defendant's power to preserve his evidence over that period,6 5 and the total amount
of time elapsed from the date of the criminal event. Where prosecution is
predicated upon occurrences whose proof depends upon the testimony of
observers and a number of years have passed, prejudice may even be
"presumed." 66 But in the instant case defendant made no claim of actual
impediment to his defense, 67 and automatically to say, as does the dissent,
that "prejudice is presumed" 6 -- if by prejudice is meant such handicap as
significantly impairs defendant's power to prove his case-seems, after
thirty weeks, unsound.69 The instant case seems thoroughly in accord
with both precedent and reason in holding that, whatever defendant's right
to accelerate his trial may have been, he had on the date of his conviction
no constitutional right to dismissal.

RIMINAL PROCEDURE-FEDERA

CoNVICT oN CONDrIONAL
D To H.Awv No RIGHT TO OouwsBL AT PARoI, BOAt
REvoCATION H AXING
AsE iH

RI

Petitioner was released from the United States penitentiary at Alcatraz
pursuant to the federal criminal code which provides for the conditional
release of federal prisoners upon the expiration of their sentences less time
61
Provoo, 17 F.R.D. at 203. See McWilliams, 69 F. Supp. at 815, quoted in
163 F.2d
at 696.
62
Taylor, 238 F.2d at 262.
63
ChaSe, 135 F. Supp. at 233.

64

Consider (1) indictment for murder; alibi defense, (2) indictment for filing

false tax return; all evidence documentary, (3) indictment for failing to register
under the registry provisions of a federal statute; failure to register admitted; defense
of unconstitutionality of registry provisions. That the strength or weakness of the
prosecution's case may also be significant in this regard is recognized in Taylor,
238 F.2d
at 262, and McWilliams, 69 F. Supp. at 814 (semble).
65
In this regard, defendant's interim incarceration may become significant See
238 F.2d at 262.
Taylor,
6

GProvoo, 17 F.R.D. at 203. See note 60 stpra.
7YKing's brief on appeal argues that delay "must have had an effect on the
memory of witnesses, as well as on the willingness of witnesses to testify," Brief
6

for Appellant, p. 20, but no specification of actual prejudice is made.
68 Instant case at 573.
69 In this connection consider United States v. Cadarr, 197 U.S. 475 (1905),
holding that D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-104 (1951), which provides that where a grand
jury has not within nine months taken action on the case of an accused committed
or held to bail "the prosecution of such charge shall be deemed to have been abandoned and the accused shall be set free or his bail discharged," does not abridge
the general statute of limitations or bar prosecution on indictment returned beyond
the nine-month period, but operates only to require release from pre-trial confinement or discharge of bail. The limitation of prosecution for non-capital offenses in

the District is now five years. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1958).
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deducted for good conduct.1 Thereafter, upon receipt by the United States
Parole Board of information indicating violations of the terms of his release,2 petitioner was arrested and, after a hearing before the Board at which
he appeared personally, release was revoked and petitioner was recommitted
to serve the remainder of his sentence. Applying for writ of habeas corpus,
petitioner sought release on the ground that he had requested but was
refused assistance of his counsel at the revocation hearing. The district
court, denying the petition, held that under section 4207 of the criminal
code,3 providing, inter alia, that "a prisoner retaken upon a warrant issued
by the Board of Parole, shall be given an opportunity to appear before the
Board . . . ," a conditional releasee has no right to counsel at a revoca-

tion hearing. Lopex v. Madigan, 174 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
Unlike a federal parolee whose release from custody is in the sole
discretion of the Parole Board when it deems that "there is a reasonable
probability that such [a] prisoner will . . . remain at liberty without
violating the laws" and that "release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society," 4 a conditional releasee earns his status as a matter of right under
section 4163 of the federal criminal code. 5 Prior to 1932 such releases, obtained on the basis of a good-conduct time deduction, were granted unconditionally. 6 At that date, Congress provided that prisoners released
on the basis of good-time deductions are to be treated as if released on
parole. 7 Thus, prisoners released pursuant to section 4163 are subject, at
the least, to like conditions upon release as are parolees released in the discretion of the Board.8 Moreover, it is clearly arguable, as the instant court
118 U.S.C. §§4161, 4163 (1958).
2 Reportedly petitioner had mysteriously acquired new clothes, had been implicated
by a burglar's confession and was wanted for questioning in connection with a bank
robbery. When his parole officer was unable to communicate with him after repeated
attempts, a warrant for his arrest was issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1958).
See Schiffman v. Wilkinson, 216 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 916
(1955).
3 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1958). This section provides: "A prisoner retaken upon a
warrant issued by the Board of Parole, shall be given an opportunity to appear before
the Board, a member thereof, or an examiner designated by the Board. The Board
may then, or at any time in its discretion, revoke the order of parole and terminate
such parole or modify the terms and conditions thereof. If such order of parole shall
be revoked and the parole so terminated, the said prisoner may be required to serve all
or any part of the remainder of the term for which he was sentenced."
4 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1958).
Parole may not be demanded as of right. United
States v. Howell, 103 F. Supp. 714, 717-18 (S.D.W. Va.), af'd, 199 F.2d 367 (4th
Cir. 1952).
5 18 U.S.C. § 4163 (1958). This section provides: "A prisoner shall be released
at the expiration of his term of sentence less the time deducted for good conduct."
See Gould v. Green, 141 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Carroll v. Squier, 136 F.2d 571
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 793 (1943); King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291
(D.C. Cir. 1938). Good-time allowance is computed according to the terms of 18
U.S.C. §4161 (1958).
6Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 146, 14 Stat. 424; Act of June 14, 1870, ch. 128, 16
Stat. 151; S. REP. No. 385, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1951).
718 U.S.C. §4164 (1958): "A prisoner having served his term or terms less
good-time deductions shall, upon release, be deemed as if released on parole until the
expiration of the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced less one hundred
and eighty days."
8 Story v. Rives, 97 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 595 (1938).
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holds, that "'all provisions of law relating to the parole,'" 9 including
those requiring that "a prisoner retaken . . . shall be given an opportunity to appear before the Board" 10 and that "the Board may then, or at
any time in its discretion, revoke the order of parole," : were intended to
relate equally to conditional release. Nevertheless, petitioner here contended first, that as he was originally discharged as a matter of right on
conditional release rather than as a parolee, the actions of the Parole
Board upon revocation must be measured against a stricter procedural
standard, 12 and that that standard would require the Board to afford opportunity to appear with counsel even though, as has been held, 13 federal
parolees have no such right; and, secondly, that even if the procedural
standards are identical upon revocation of parole and conditional release,
"opportunity to appear" 14 includes the right to appear with counsel.
Aside from the question of statutory analysis or congressional intent,
constitutional considerations may initially be determinative. It has been
argued that Parole Board proceedings for revocation of conditional release
are a part of a "criminal prosecution" 15 under the sixth amendment requirement that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 10

The right

7
to counsel under the amendment accrues in most cases at arraignment,1
persists at least to sentencing,' 8 but does not necessarily extend to appeal.' 9

9

Instant case at 920-21. This language is from the Act of June 29, 1932, ch. 310,

§ 4, 47 Stat. 381. In 1951, when a provision was added to the effect that no releasee

with less than 180 days remaining until expiration of sentence can be recommitted,
the phrase was changed to "shall . . . be deemed as if released on parole." 18 U.S.C.
§ 4164 (1958). This was, as the instant court holds, no change in substance. S. REP.
No. 385, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1951).
10 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1958).

11 Ibid.
12 Petitioner also contended that, for the same reasons, the discretion of the
Board upon release revocation was more circumscribed and its exercise to be measured
against a stricter standard of review than in the case of revocation of parole. The
court held that the discretionary standards were the same. Instant case at 920.
13 Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd by equally divided court,
340 U.S. 880 (1950).
14
See note 3 supra.
15 "It appears unrealistic to state unequivocally that such a proceeding [to revoke
conditional release] is not a 'criminal prosecution,' because it is actually a continuation
of those proceedings." Flandrick, Revocation of Conditional Liberty-Californiaand
the Federal System, 28 So. CAl.. L. REv. 158, 170 (1955).
16 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938). See FED. R. CRim. P. 44.
17 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 722-23 (1948); Kraft v. United States,
238 F.2d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 1956); Snell v. United States, 174 F.2d 580 (10th Cir.
1949); Michener v. Johnston, 141 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1944). But see Council v.
Clemmer, 177 F.2d 22, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 875 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945) (right not infringed where counsel appointed
subsequent to plea of not guilty).
IsVon Moltke v. Gillies, supra note 17, at 721; Snell v. United States, supra
note 17, at 581-82; Thomas v. Hunter, 153 F.2d 834, 839 (10th Cir. 1946).
19 Osborne v. Johnston, 120 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Lovvorn v. Johnston, 118
F.2d 704, 707 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 607 (1941) ; Errington v. Hudspeth,
110 F.2d 384 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 638 (1940); Garrison v. Johnston,
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As the right may be extinguished before the time of appellate hearing, it is
reasonable to conclude that it does not later revive to encompass a hearing
to revoke conditional release.20 Furthermore, revocation of conditional
release is not a modification of the original sentence 21 since, as the federal
good-conduct statute is in effect at the time sentence is passed,2 2 its terms
are taken into account by the sentencing judge and, consequently, incorporated. 28 It thus appears that a revocation hearing cannot be considered
part of a "criminal prosecution." Nevertheless, it may be contended that
petitioner is afforded right to counsel by due process. 2 4 The safeguards of
the fifth amendment extend beyond the scope of the sixth to include noncriminal as well as criminal proceedings.2 5 In a criminal case due process
104 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553 (1939); cf. Scwab v. Berggren,
143 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1892). See also Dunlap v. Swope, 103 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1939)
(presence of defendant himself denied at appeal) ; Nivens v. United States, 139 F.2d
226, 228 (5th Cir. 1943) (motion to correct sentence not within a criminal prosecution
so as2 to require counsel under sixth amendment).
0Revocation of probation or suspension of sentence is not a part of a criminal
prosecution. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 219-20 (1932) ; United States v.
Hollien, 105 F. Supp. 987, 988 (W.D. Mich. 1952) ; People v. Fields, 88 Cal. App. 2d
30, 33, 198 P.2d 104, 106 (2d Dist. 1948) ; Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935)
(dictum) ; cf. State ex rel. Cutsinger v. Spencer, 219 Ind. 148, 152-53, 41 N.E.2d 601,
602-03
(1941).
21
Van Buskirk v. Wilkinson, 216 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Hall v. Welsh,
185 F.2d 525, 527 (4th Cir. 1950).
22 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1958), providing for the computation of good-conduct allowances, is the current enactment of Act of June 29, 1932, ch. 310, § 2,47 Stat. 381, and
governs all sentences imposed since July 29, 1932. Douglas v. King, 110 F.2d 911,
913 2(8th Cir. 1940).
8An example of a trial court's deliberations on the effect of a good-time statute
on sentence to be imposed appears in United States v. Nash, 51 F.2d 253, 254 (S.D.
N.Y. 1931).
24 "Due process of law is secured against invasion by the federal Government by
the Fifth Amendment, and is safeguarded against state action in identical words by
the Fourteenth. The phrase formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those
envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights." Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). "[T]he due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or the Fifth Amendment requires counsel for all persons charged with
serious crimes, when necessary for their adequate defense, in order that such persons
may be advised how to conduct their trials." Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437,
441 (1948). (Emphasis added.) This language makes it clear that with respect to
right to counsel, due process limitations upon the states are duplicated by the due
process limitations upon the federal government. It may even be argued that the due
process clause of the fifth amendment imposes greater limitations on the federal
government than that of the fourteenth on the states. Compare Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial discrimination by states prohibited by fourteenth amendment equal protection clause), with Boiling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)
(racial discrimination by federal government prohibited by fifth amendment due process
clause). In any event, right-to-counsel cases decided under the fourteenth are relevant
in construing the fifth amendment. The interrelation of fifth, sixth, and fourteenth
amendments is discussed in Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal
Courts,
30 NFB. L. Rv. 559 (1951).
25
Administrative proceedings must conform to due process limitations. Shields
v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938) ; Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142 (1922) ;
The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). It has been held that there is a
due process right to be represented by counsel at certain administrative hearings that
are adjudicative and may result in a loss of liberty. United States ex rel. CastroLouzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (deportation proceedings) ;
Ex parte Chin Loy You, 223 Fed. 833 (D. Mass. 1915). At other types of proceedings
counsel may be excluded without deprivation of due process. Niznik v. United States,
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may secure the right to counsel prior to arraignment; 26 moreover, due
process requires that an accused be permitted "effective" 27 assistance of
counsel in the preparation and conduct of his trial 28 and, in capital cases,
29
that counsel be made available for this purpose to indigent defendants.
However, while the sixth amendment may be invoked merely by showing
that one is an accused in a criminal prosecution, ° the due process right to
counsel is relative to the possibility of prejudice resulting from absence
of legal aid.3 ' Thus, counsel need not be furnished to indigents in every
case; 32 denial of appointed counsel in a non-capital case, while it may
be per se violative of the sixth amendment, is merely one of several circumstances determinative of whether due process has been violated.3 3
Although the right to due process extends beyond the time when trial is
complete, the different nature of post- as against pre-conviction proceedings
may give different incidents to the constitutional guarantee after conviction.34 Trial rules implementing the constitutional right to confrontation
173 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1949); United States v. Miller, 143 F. Supp. 712 (N.D.W.

Va.), aff'd, 239 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1956) (draft board hearings); United States v.

Pitt, 144 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1944) (dictum). Where the administrative proceeding is
investigatory rather than adjudicative, counsel may be excluded. In re Groban, 352
U.S. 330 (1957) (fire marshal's investigation of cause of fire). For amplification of
the obvious theme that due process applies to a wider ainbit of activity than criminal
prosecution, consider, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892) ; Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199, 203 (10th Cir. 1942) ; cf. Bute v. Illinois, 333
U.S. 640, 649, 656-59 (1948); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 136-37 (1947). See
also Bolling v. Sharp, supra note 24.
26 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957) ; Reece v. Georgia, 350
U.S. 85, 89-90 (1955); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439-40 (1958) (dictum).
2
7 Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 278 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760,
763-64 (1945) ; House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945) ; Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S.
114, 115-16 (1944) ; Bovey v. Grandsinger, 253 F.2d 917, 922 (8th Cir. 1958) ; O'Brien
v. Lindsey, 204 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir. 1953); United States v. Bergamo, 154 F.2d
31, 34
(3d Cir. 1946).
28
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1955); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S.
3, 9-10 (1954) ; Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 684 (1948) ; United States v. Jackson,
234 F.2d 742, 745 (2d Cir. 1956) ; O'Brien v. Lindsey, supra note 27, at 362; Crooker
v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958) (dictum); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173,
174 2(1946)
(dictum); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (dictum).
9
Reece v. Georgia, supra note 28, at 89-90; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
71 (1932).
30 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). See FED. R. Cam. P. 44.
3
l Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950) ; Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736
(1948) ; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) ; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
32
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728
(1948); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173
(1946) ; Betts v. Brady, supra note 31.
33 Other relevant circumstances are: the seriousness of the crime, Uveges v.
Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the complexity of the legal issues involved, Gibbs v.
Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) ; the age, mentality,
and education of the accused, Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Wade v.
Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); the
accused's familiarity with courts and criminal law, Crooker v. California, upra;
Uveges v. Pennsylvania, supra; Betts v. Brady, supra note 32; Smith v. O'Grady,
312 U.S. 329 (1941); the care shown by the trial court in protecting the rights of
the accused, Gibbs v. Burke, supra; Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
34 Taylor v. United States, 179 F.2d 640, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Siipola v. Ness,
90 F. Supp. 18, 21 (W.D. Wash. 1950).
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and cross-examination of witnesses 3r no longer apply. For example, an
accused may be sentenced on the basis of hearsay and thus denied confrontation.3 6 Furthermore, while an appeal when granted is subject to due
process strictures," due process does not require that either the convicted
defendant or his counsel be given an opportunity to appear before the
appellate tribunal.38 True, a hearing for revocation of conditional release,
though coming long after appeal, in some respects resembles a trial: charged
with violating a prescribed code of conduct, an accused is subjected to a
proceeding for the determination of facts upon which incarceration may
turn. To look no further, however, is to ignore the context in which such
hearings are conducted. A conditional releasee is a prisoner duly convicted
of crime and sentenced; although he has earned in confinement the right to
enjoy a conditional liberty,3 9 he remains in the custody of federal authority. 40
A revocation hearing is not a trial of a new criminal case,41 nor does
revocation constitute a new or modified sentence under the earlier conviction. 42 It simply annuls the commutation of that part of a sentence which
orders confinement. 43 In sum, revocation after a hearing from which
counsel has been excluded is not a deprivation of liberty without due process
because the liberty afforded by conditional release is in fact a statutory
privilege granted by Congress and in its grant circumscribed by such procedures for the ascertainment of the propriety of revocation as that body
deems appropriate. 44 Finally, before denial of counsel may be said to
violate due process, there must be a showing that in the circumstances the
presence of counsel might have cured an otherwise substantial possibility of
3

365 U.S.

CONST. amend. VI.
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
Due process does not require that an appeal be permitted. Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953) ; McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894) ; District
of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627 (1937) (dictum). But if appeal is granted,
it must conform to due process standards. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) ;
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327
(1915).
38 Chessman v. California, 205 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
916 (1953).
39 Gould v. Green, 141 F.2d 533, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Carroll v. Squier, 136
F.2d 571, 573 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 793 (1943) ; Douglas v. King, 110 F.2d
911 (8th Cir. 1940) ; King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
40 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1958). See, e.g., Minder v. Assistant Director, 229 F.2d
432 (6th Cir. 1955); United States ex rel. Rowe v. Nicholson, 78 F.2d 468, 469-70
(4th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 573 (1935).
41 A revocation hearing has been typified a non-judicial proceeding.
Christianson
v. Zerbst, 89 F.2d 40, 43 (10th Cir. 1937). But cf. Moorehead v. Hunter, 198 F2d 52,
54 (10th Cir. 1952) (semble).
42 See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
43 Jenkins v. Madigan, 211 F.2d 904 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 842 (1954);
Duehay v. Thompson, 223 Fed. 305 (9th Cir. 1915) ; United States ex rel. Gutterson
v. Thompson, 47 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 135 F.2d 626 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 755 (1943).
44 Gould v. Green, 141 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1944) ; United States ex rel. Jacobs
v. Barc, 141 F.2d 480 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 751 (1944) ; Dolan v. Swope,
138 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1943) ; United States ex rel. Nicholson v. Dillard, 102 F.2d
94 (4th Cir. 1939) ; United States ex rel. Rowe v. Nicholson, 78 F.2d 468 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 573 (1935). Cf. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935)
(Cardozo, J.) (suspension of sentence may be coupled with such conditions in respect
of its duration as Congress may impose).
37
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prejudice. 45 There was no such showing in the instant case. But even
where it cannot be said that the minimal standards of the Constitution have
been infringed, a consideration of constitutional rights is helpful in understanding the universe of values within which Congress legislates. Due
process is more than a commandment forbidding certain deprivations; it
is also a declaration of the reverence with which liberty is regarded. It
cannot be assumed that Congress seeks to preclude the consistent extension of constitutional values merely because it has the constitutional power
to do so. On the contrary, it must be presumed that all legislation is intended to recognize these values as they are reflected in traditional forms of
fair procedure.46
The question remains whether the "opportunity to appear," guaranteed
petitioner by section 4207, includes the statutory right to appear with
counsel. 47 In Hiatt v. Compagna,48 it was held that federal parolees had
been afforded "an opportunity to appear" within the meaning of the statute
even though their counsel were excluded from a revocation hearing. Con45 See cases cited note 31 upra. It has been stated that a conditional releasee
has no constitutional right to counsel at a revocation hearing. Moore v. Reid, 246
F.2d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dictum).
46Representation by counsel is not the only procedural safeguard to be thus
respected. In Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), a civilian engineer brought
suit against the Secretary of the Navy, charging a denial of due process when his
security clearance was revoked as a result of information furnished by witnesses he
was not permitted to confront 6r cross-examine. The opinion pointed out that "where
administrative action has raised serious constitutional problems, the Court has assumed
that Congress or the President intended to afford those affected by the action the
traditional safeguards of due process. [Citing cases.] These cases reflect the Court's
concern that traditional forms of fair procedure not be restricted by implication and
without the most explicit action by the Nation's lawmakers, even in areas where it is
possible that the Constitution presents no inhibition." Id. at 507-08.
47
The legislative history of § 4207 fails to reveal whether appearance with counsel
was thought desirable. In 1910 a bill was submitted to the Senate providing that
"at any time during the period of parole the board by which the prisoner was released
may, in its discretion, revoke the order and terminate such parole . . . ." H.R.
REP. No. 1341, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1910).
However, before enacted, it was
amended so as to provide that a parolee returned to prison "shall be given an opportunity to appear" before the board of parole, "and the said board may then or at any
time in its discretion revoke the . . . parole . . . ." Upon the recommendation of
the Conference Committee, H.R. REP. No. 1701, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1910),
the bill was approved as amended. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 6, 36 Stat. 820.
Subsequently, the section was amended to provide that revocation hearings could be
conducted before the Board, a single member, or an examiner designated by the Board.
Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 449, § 3, 54 Stat. 692. The purpose of the amendment was
to permit flexibility in the interest of administrative efficiency and economy. S. REP.
No. 1854, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1940). Although it was thought that under the
then existing law the desired flexibility was probably permissible, the Attorney
General urged that "with a view to eliminating any possible doubt in this matter, it
seems desirable to enact an express provision . . . ." H.R. REP.' No. 1606, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 4 (1940).
(The instant court, at 921-22, cites with approval Hiatt v.
Compagna, 178 F.2d 42, 46 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd by equally divided court, 340 U.S.
880 (1950), for the proposition that the 1940 amendment is indicative of congressional
intent to keep the hearings informal. But the concept that informality necessarily
excludes counsel is rebutted by D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-206 (1951). See note 55 infra.)
The section was put into its present form when the criminal code was revised in 1948.
No changes were made with respect to "opportunity to appear" and the reviser's
notes were silent on the subject. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1958). See H.R. REP. No. 304,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. A 188 (1948).
48 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd by equally divided court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950).
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struing section 4164 4 9-that conditional releasees shall be treated as if
released on parole-as a congressional mandate that "all provisions of law
relating to parole were intended to relate generally to conditional release," 50
the instant court reaffirmed and extended the Compagna rule. In so holding, the court went beyond the avowed purpose of section 4164: to establish
minimal standards of behavior for prisoners released by operation of the
good-conduct statute and subject them to parole-like supervision. 5' But
only if in fact Congress intended that parolees have no right to counsel,
and if in fact it intended that with respect to procedures employed by the
Board in its adjudicative proceedings-and more particularly with respect
to right to counsel-conditional releasees be treated as parolees, the conclusion of the instant court is correct. 52 It is submitted that Congress did not
necessarily have either of those intentions.
It is clear that, standing alone, the phrase "opportunity to appear"
expresses no intent with respect to the right to be represented by counsel
when the "opportunity" is afforded. 53 In construing an ambiguous provision in a statute courts may look to other statutes pertaining to similar
subjects in order to ascertain a comprehensive legislative policy that may
resolve the ambiguity. 54 Section 24-206 of the District of Columbia Code, 55
49 18 U.S.C. §4164 (1958).

:o Instant case at 920-21.
51
Itwas thought desirable to exercise some degree of control over releasees in
order to promote their rehabilitation to normal and useful life. S. REP. No. 803, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1932).
52 By its terms § 4207 appears to apply to parolees only.
53 See note 47 supra.
5
4 Under the in par inateria doctrine, contiguous legislation may be used as an
aid in construing statutes. See, e.g., United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948);
United States v. Steward, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940). A later enactment may be used
to construe prior acts. Great No. Ry. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 266-77 (1942) ;
SarlIs v. United States, 152 U.S. 570, 576-77 (1894); Steiner v. Mitchell, 215 F.2d
171, 173 (6th Cir. 1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 247, 254-55 (1956). And both federal and
state courts have treated statutes as manifesting a legislative policy that is applicable
in non-contiguous areas. See, e.g., Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U. S.342
(1937); UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); Gooch v. Oregon Short
Line R.R., 258 U.S. 22 (1922) ; Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918) ; Brewer
v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956); lume v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, 121 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30 (1st Cir.
1908) ; Metaxas v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Cal. 1946); F. A. Straus
& Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 254 N.Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564 (1930) ; South & Cent. Am.
Commercial Co. v. Panama R.R., 237 N.Y. 287, 142 N.E. 666 (1923) ; United Security
Trust Co. Case, 321 Pa. 276, 184 AtI. 106 (1936). The validity of statutory analogy
was first recognized by the common-law doctrine of the "equity of the statute." See
Davies, The Interpretation of Statutes in the Light of Their Policy by the English
Courts, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 519 (1935) ; Loyd, The Equity of a Statute, 58 U. PA. L.
REv. 76 (1909) ; Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 ILL. L. REv.
202 (1936). As legislative enactments more and more replace the common law,
analogical reasoning from statutes becomes increasingly important, tending both to
supplement and to supplant the use of common-law case precedents through stare
decisis. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVAPn LEGAAL EssAys 213
(1934); Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA L. REv. 207 (1917); Horack,
The Common Law of Legislation: Statutes as Bases for Analogical Reasoning, 23
IowA L. REv. 41 (1937); Page, Statutes as Common Law Principles, 1944 Wis. L.
REv. 175; Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REV. 383 (1908);
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1936).
55 D.C. CODE § 24-206 (1951) : "When a prisoner has been retaken upon a warrant issued by the Board of Parole, he shall be given an opportunity to appear before
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providing for revocation hearings for District parolees, has been referred
to as a manifestation of congressional policy with respect to right to counsel
at revocation hearings. 56 Fleming v. Tate,57 decided in 1946, held that
"opportunity to appear" under the then operative section 24-206 meant
opportunity to appear with counsel; the following year, Congress deliberately endorsed this interpretation by amending section 24-206 to provide expressly that prisoners could be represented by counsel at revocation hearings.58 The instant court thought this action indicated only an
intent to treat District of Columbia prisoners more favorably than other
federal prisoners, 59 and in support of its contention cited disparities between
District and federal provisions making prisoners of the District eligible for
parole earlier than their opposite numbers in other federal penitentiaries.60
But it is quite possible that Congress might desire different eligibility rules
and yet wish District of Columbia and other federal prisoners to have the
same rights at revocation hearings. The argument principally relied on by
the Board, a member thereof, or an examiner designated by the Board. At such
hearing he may be represented by counsel. The Board may then, or at any time
in its discretion, terminate the parole or modify the terms and conditions thereof.
*
. . In the event a prisoner is confined in, or as a parolee is returned to a penal
or correctional institution other than a penal or correctional institution of the District
of Columbia, the Board of Parole created by section 723a, Title 18, U.S. Code, shall
have and exercise the same power and authority as the Board of Parole of the District of Columbia had the prisoner been confined in or returned to a penal or correctional institution of the District of Columbia."
56
Moore v. Reid, 246 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See notes 72-73 infra and
accompanying text.
57156 F2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
58 The original amending bill as reported read: "When a prisoner has been retaken
upon a warrant issued by the Board of Parole, he shall be given an opportunity to
appear before the Board, a member thereof, or an examiner designated by the Board.
At such hearing he may, in the discretion of the Board and under such rules as it may
promulgate, be represented by counsel." H.R. 494, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1947).
It was presented to the House with the following statement, contained in a letter
from the President of the District of Columbia Board of Commissioners to the Chairman of the House Committee on the District of Columbia, and incorporated into
the report: "The principal changes made in existing law are, first, that, when a
prisoner who has violated his parole is retaken upon a warrant, the hearing, instead
of being required to be before the Board, may be either before the Board, a member
thereof, or an examiner designated by the Board. Second, in the case of Fleming v.
Tate . . . it was held that, as the existing law provided that such a prisoner 'shall
be given an opportunity to appear before said Board,' it was the intention of Congress
to give him the right to be represented by counsel. Such a ruling was contrary
to the administrative construction placed upon the act and also upon the similar
Federal Parole Act which had been in existence since 1910. . . ." H.R. REP No. 451,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6 (1947). However, the bill as passed by the Senate was
amended so as to strike out the words "in the discretion of the Board and under
such rules as it may promulgate." The House then concurred in the amendment,
and the bill was passed, providing that a prisoner "may be represented by counsel."
Act of July 17, 1947, ch. 263, § 6, 61 Stat 379. See 93 CONG. Rsc. 8225, 8470 (1947).
It is thus elear from the legislative history that Congress sought to perpetuate the
Tate rule.
59 Instant case at 922.
60 Indeterminate sentences may be imposed upon District of Columbia prisoners.
After serving the minimum sentence, the prisoner is eligible for parole. D.C. CoDE
ANN. § 24-203 (1951).
The District of Columbia Parole Board may petition the
sentencing court to reduce a prisoner's minimum sentence. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-201c
(1951). No such procedure exists with respect to other federal prisoners. See 18

U.S.C. § 4202 (1958).
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the instant court, however, was simply that if Congress had wanted to
permit the appearance of counsel under section 4207, it would have said
so when in 1948 it revised the criminal code.61 This argument is more neat
than realistic. The congressional work-load is such that it is unreasonable
to conclude that every provision of the criminal code was carefully analyzed
with a view to approval or amendment when the title was revised. 62
Moreover the instant court failed altogether to consider the implications
of the last paragraph of section 24-206, which provides that where a District
of Columbia prisoner is confined in a fedeial penitentiary outside the District, the United States Board of Parole shall have and exercise over him
the same power and authority which the District of Columbia Board would
have if he were confined in the District.63 This means that such a prisoner
may be paroled by the United States Board and, once paroled, may have his
release revoked by that Board. It would seem at least implied, then, that
while revocation hearings before the United States Board are normally
conducted pursuant to section 4207, in this instance the federal board's
powers are the same as those of the District Board, and that the former
therefore does not have the power to exclude counsel from the hearing. By
expressly declaring in one statutory section that parolees have a right to
counsel in appearances before the District Board and that the federal board
has the same powers-and presumably by implication the same limitations
on its powers-as the District Board, Congress would seem to have manifested, in the one situation where it has reviewed the question of right-tocounsel before the federal board, its policy with respect to such a right.
Three levels of conclusion may be inferred from this congressional action:
(1) that Congress intended to ensure that District of Columbia prisoners
may have counsel when appearing before the United States Board-this
is but a statement of the express purpose of the statute, (2) that Congress
found no reasons compelling denial of counsel before the United States
Board-this is a corollary to the reasonably foreseen operation of the
District of Columbia Code, and (3) that Congress probably favors permit61
Admittedly there are normative arguments pro and con with respect to the
wisdom of permitting counsel to appear at revocation hearings. See Fleming v. Tate,
156 F.2d 848, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1946). The instant court, however, did not base its
decision on such arguments, but treated the issue as legislatively foreclosed. Instant
case 62at 922.
There is no evidence that the right to counsel was considered when § 4207
was reenacted, although the last paragraph of the section, pertaining to computing
remaining sentence, was "rewritten to clarify and ratify existing administrative practice and construction . . . ." H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A188
(1948). See also, Willard & MacDonald, The Effect of an Unsuccessful Attempt To
Amend a Statute, 44 CoRNEU. L.Q. 336 (1959).
63 D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-206 (1951). The last paragraph providing "in the event a
prisoner is confined in, or as a parolee is returned to a penal or correctional institution other than [in the District of Columbia, the United States Parole Board]
• . . shall have and exercise the same power and authority as the Board of Parole
of the District of Columbia had the prisoner been confined in or returned to a penal
or correctional institution of the District of Columbia," was first added in 1940.
Act of June 6, 1940, ch. 254, § 5, 54 Stat. 242. See the general provision to the same
effect: D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-209 (1951), first enacted by act of June 5, 1934, ch. 391, 48
Stat. 880. See S. REP. No. 674, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
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ting the appearance of counsel before the United States Board-this is
admittedly a general induction based on a specific instance, but it receives
strong collateral support from another congressional pronouncement in a
similar but non-contiguous area: 6 the Administrative Procedure Act which
provides that persons compelled to appear at hearings conducted by administrative agencies "shall be accorded the right to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel .

65

*.".."

The APA reveals a general,

congressional policy with respect to counsel at hearings; 16 that this general
policy can be applied to revocation hearings is proved by section 24-206;
that it can be applied to proceedings before the United States Board seems
also proved by the last paragraph of that section.
As petitioner in the instant case claimed the right to have counsel appear at the revocation hearing itself, the distinction between Compagn and
Tate is pivotal. This distinction is essentially one of emphasis inasmuch as,
while the court in Compagna held that the Federal Parole Board's "formal
offer to counsel that he appear before the Board in person or in writing, and
present what he desired, followed by the appearance in person of the
prisoners . . ." was a sufficient opportunity to appear, 7 the court in Tate
remarked that "the participation of counsel in a proceeding such as [a
revocation hearing]

. . . need be no greater than is necessary to insure

to the Board as well as to the parolee, that the Board is accurately informed
from the parolee's standpoint before it acts .
6s Both rules accept
the premise that counsel may participate in the decision-making process;
they differ only with respect to his appearance alongside the prisoner at
revocation hearings. And whereas Compagna was affirmed by an equally
divided Supreme Court,69 the principle announced in Tate was unequivocally
ratified by express enactment of Congress "°-indications of judicial and
legislative temper which may be important where, as here, inferential extension of inconsistent rules derived from statute is at issue.
*..."

64 See note 54 supra.
65

Administrative Procedure Act § 6, 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a)
(1958) : "Any person compelled to appear in person before any agency or representative thereof shall be accorded the right to be accompanied, represented, and advised
by counsel . . . . Every party shall be accorded the right to appear in person or
by or with counsel . .. ."
66 See note 46 supra and accompanying text. It was held in Hiatt v. Compagna,
178 F.2d 42, 45 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd by equally divided court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950),
that the Administrative Procedure Act was not governing because "the whole matter
of paroles is left to the informed discretion of the Board," and therefore § 10 of the
act, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958), precludes judicial review. It
should be noted, however, that the Board exercises no discretion whatever with respect
to whether conditional releasees will be released. See cases cited notes 5 and 39
mipra. Thus it cannot be assumed that under Compagna the act is not applicable to
hearings to revoke conditional release, because of the rule that a case is not binding
precedent on a point neither before the court nor discussed in the decision. United
States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33 (1952).
67178 F.2d at 46.
68 156 F2d at 849.
69 340 U.S. 880 (1950).
70 See note 58 supra.
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The problem in the instant case is to determine whether statutory
analogies sustain the implementation of the rule of Tate as harmonious with
the demonstrated policy of Congress, or whether section 4164 compels that
Compagna govern. Because statutes are not to be mechanically applied
so as to defeat the purposes of the legislature, 7' it seems particularly inappropriate to use 4164 to extend a rule of no-right-to-counsel when the
purpose of the section related to the quite different subject-area of postrelease supervision. It is unfortunate that the instant court declined to
follow the recent authority of Moore v. Reid,72 which seems to have extended the Tate construction of section 24-206 to section 4207.7. Had the
court been persuaded by this example to eschew a merely mechanistic application of section 4164, it could have reached a result more complementary
to constitutional values and more in accord with what the best available
legislative evidence reveals of the probable intent of Congress.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-ScoPE

OF APPELLATE REVIEW OF

SENTEINES I1T CAPITAL CASES

During the attempted robbery of a Philadelphia drugstore by appellant
and two other youths, all of whom were fifteen years of age, appellant shot
and fatally wounded the proprietor of the store. Initially having pleaded
not guilty, appellant changed his plea to guilty of murder generally after
similar pleas had been entered by his two co-felons. A three-judge court
found all three defendants guilty of murder of the first degree, sentencing
appellant to death and his two companions to life imprisonment. On appeal,
appellant urged, among other contentions which were rejected by the court,'
71 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) ; Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell,
335 U.S. 377 (1948); United States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50
(1942); United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 542-44 (1940).
72246 F2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
73 The instant court declined to follow Moore, holding that the hearing there was
conducted under D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-206 (1951), and not 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1958).
But while the headnotes in Moore do refer to § 24-206, the opinion in the district
court states outright that § 4207 is being construed, Moore v. Reid, 142 F. Supp. 481,
483, 484 (D.D.C. 1956), and the opinion of the court of appeals, although disturbingly
noncommital on the point, does contain hints which argue for § 4207. See 246 F.2d
at 655 n.4, 659 ("the statute, and the Code").
(Emphasis added.)
No previous
decisions in the Moore case seem to have been reported, and the background facts
as related in the 1956-1957 opinions are too scanty to serve as a basis for further
analysis. In whichever way Moore is read, however, Robbins v. Reed, 269 F..d 242
(D.C. Cir. 1959), decided subsequently to the instant case, expressly holds that a
parolee's opportunity to be heard under § 4207 includes the right to be represented
by counsel.

'The court rejected appellant's contentions (1) that the trial court erred in
refusing to grant a petition for change of venue based on newspaper accounts of the
crime which were allegedly prejudicial to the defendant; (2) that the trial court
erred in admitting into evidence a confession voluntarily given by defendant; and
(3) that the trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant to withdraw his plea
of guilty before resentencing (defendant fainted during the first pronouncement of the
sentence and was not consciously present during the entire proceeding).
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that the lower court had abused its discretion in imposing the death penalty.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reduced the death sentence to life
imprisonment on the grounds that, in considering only the criminal act and
giving no consideration to the age, mentality and background of the criminal,
the lower court had abused the discretion vested in it by the legislature.2
Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959).
In a similar case decided on the same day, three appellants, whose ages
ranged from eighteen to twenty years, entered pleas of guilty to murder
generally following the robbery-killing of another Philadelphia druggist. A
three-judge court found all three felons guilty of murder of the first degree
and sentenced them to death. On appeal, appellants did not challenge the
judgments of first degree murder but contended that the trial court had
erred in imposing the death sentence on each defendant. The supreme court
affirmed the sentence of appellant Williams, who had fired the fatal shot,
but vacated the sentences of his two younger companions and remitted the
records to the lower court for resentencing 3 on the ground that the court
had erred in interpreting certain statements in the confession of one of the
appellants as applying also to the others.4 Commonwealth v. Cater, 396
Pa. 172, 152 A.2d 259 (1959).
As a general rule, appellate courts in the United States do not have the
power to review the propriety of and to vacate or reduce sentences imposed
upon defendants where such sentences are within the statutory limits of
punishment for the offense.5 However, an attack upon the validity of a
7
sentence, either on appeal 6 or on petition for a writ of habeas corpus, will
be sustained where the sentence in question is in excess of the limits imposed
by the legislature,8 where the sentence is based upon findings not supported
2 PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 18, § 4701 (1945). The pertinent portion of the statute
provides: "In cases of pleas of guilty, the court, where it determines the crime to be
murder of the first degree, shall, at its discretion, impose sentence of death or imprisonment for life. . . ."

8 On October 23, 1959, appellants were again sentenced to death by the trial court.
Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 27, 1959, p. 41, col. 2.
4 "Thus, the court erred in stating that 'all three [defendants] went to Cater's
house to procure the gun long before the holdup.' The fact is that there is no evi-

dence in the record to support this statement as against either Cater or Rivers.
Similarly, the court was mistaken in its belief that as to Cater and Rivers the motive

for the crime was 'the discharge of aggressive hatred."' Commonwealth v. Cater,
396 Pa. 172, 181, 152 A.2d 259, 264 (1959).
5 See, e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) ; Wilson v. State, 268 Ala.
86, 105 So. 2d 66 (1958) ; Maynes v. People, 119 Colo. 149, 200 P.2d 915 (1948) ;
Hayes v. State, 211 Md. 111, 126 A.2d 576 (1956); Ryall v. State, 321 S.W.2d 809
(Tenn. 1958).

See generally Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal

(pts. 1-2), 37 CoLtm. L. REv. 521, 762 (1937).
6 See Burgess v. State, 256 Ala. 5, 53 So. 2d 568 (1951); People v. Fritz, 393
Ill. 162, 65 N.E.2d 686 (1946).
7 See In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Flory v. Ashe,
132 Pa. Super. 405, 1 A.2d 685 (1938).
8 Collins v. State, 224 Ind. 509, 69 N.E.2d 173 (1946) ; Commonwealth v. Schultz,
170 Pa. Super. 504, 87 A.2d 69 (1952); State v. Marx, 200 Iowa 884, 205 N.W. 518
(1925) (dictum).
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by evidence 9 or where improper procedure is followed in the imposition of
the sentence. 10 Where a reviewing court vacates an illegal or invalid sentence, it will generally remand the case to the court of original jurisdiction
with directions to impose a proper sentence; 11 however, where extraordinary circumstances are present, the appellate court will either remand with
specific instructions as to the sentence to be imposed1 2 or, where statutory
authority to reform sentences is given, 13 modify the sentence and affirm the
judgment so modified. 14
In only nine states do appellate courts have the power to inquire into
the propriety of a sentence which is within the statutory limits of punishment, based on substantial evidence and free from procedural error. In
Arkansas, Idaho, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania the power to "reverse, affirm
or modify" judgments 15 has been construed to embrace the power to modify
the sentence of a convicted criminal defendant,16 at least where such sentence
was imposed by a trial court and-not by a jury.17 Five more states have,
by explicit statutory provision, conferred upon their appellate courts the
power to reduce or modify sentences in criminal cases. In four of these
states, Arizona, Iowa, Nebraska and New York, the statutes conferring
such power provide that the reviewing court may reduce but cannot increase
9 State v. Barlow, 242 Iowa 714, 46 N.W.2d 725 (1951); State v. Murphy, 225
N.C. 115, 33 S.E2d 588 (1945). This problem arises most often under "habitual
criminal" statutes where findings of previous convictions are required.
' 0 People v. Havel, 134 Cal. App. 2d 213, 285 P2d 317 (4th Dist. 1955) (defendants sentenced in absence of counsel) ; Commonwealth v. Shields, 50 Pa. Super. 194
(1912) (no application made of indeterminate sentence law).
11 See cases cited notes 8-10 supra. But see Price v. State, 310 S.W.2d 76
(Tex. Crim. App. 1958) ; Hall v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 215, 219 S.W.2d 475 (1949).
12 Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958)
(district court failed to impose
proper sentence after remand for that purpose by Supreme Court); Kemp v. Canal
Zone, 167 F2d 938 (5th Cir. 1948) (judge who heard case had retired and left
Canal Zone).
IsSee, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 192 (1930).
14 Conmmonwealth v. Downer, 161 Pa. Super. 339, 53 A.2d 897 (1947) (trial court
exceeded powers in attempting to correct sentence previously held improper).
15ARK. STAT. ANN. §27-2144 (1947); IDAHO CODE ANN. §19-2821 (1948);
OxxA. STAT. ANN. tit 22, § 1066 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §41 (1930).
' 6 See Williams v. State, 183 Ark. 870, 39 S.W.2d 295 (1931); State v.
Linebarger, 71 Idaho 255, 232 P.2d 669 (1951); Dickson v. State, 336 P.2d 1113
(Okla. Crim. App. 1959); Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 Atl. 733
(1932).
17 It is probable that in Pennsylvania the supreme court is without power to
reduce the punishment where the death penalty is imposed in the discretion of the
jury. See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949) ("Whether
the jury exercised a wise discretion in fixing the penalty at death is not a matter for
this Court to determine."); Commonwealth v. Taranow, 359 Pa. 342, 59 A2d 53
(1948) (When the jury has fixed the penalty by its verdict, "it has done its legal
duty and its action may not properly be called in question."); Commonwealth v.
Harris, 314 Pa. 81, 171 At. 279 (1934) ("This court will not arbitrarily substitute its judgment for that of the jury even if it had the power so to do."). It does
not appear that the recently passed statute providing for a separate presentation of
evidence on the question of penalty after a verdict of guilty will affect the supreme
court's refusal to review the jury's exercise of discretion in fixing the penalty at
death or life imprisonment. Pa. Laws 1959, act 594.
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the original sentence.' 8 In Connecticut, where the power of review and
modification was not granted until 1957, a special tribunal comprised of
three superior court judges may, upon application for review by any person
sentenced to a term of one year or more, reduce or increase the punishment
of such person. 19 Both the frequency of and the grounds for the exercise
of the power of modification vary widely from state to state. For example,
during the year 1951 alone, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reduced the sentences of nineteen defendants 20 convicted of crimes ranging
from murder 21 and rape 22 to driving and liquor violations. 23 The Oklahoma court reduced a sentence where it found that the defendant was
advanced in years and had a previous good record; 24 the same court
modified a death sentence to a term of 150 years where the case was not
"out of the realm of speculative doubt." 2 5 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, on the other hand, had, prior to the Green case, reduced only two
death sentences-once where the killing resulted from provocation and
passion short of that required to compel a finding of manslaughter rather
than murder, 26 and once in a case of infanticide where the murder was
primarily attributable to conditions of extreme poverty.2 7 With these two
exceptions, the Pennsylvania court, in prior cases where the appropriateness
of the death penalty was in issue, had limited its supervisory control to indicating, without disturbing the sentence imposed by the trial court, some
of the factors which may properly be considered in fixing the penalty for
first degree murder: 28 (1) whether the crime "is based upon the mental

IsAa'z. Rv. STAT. AN. § 13-1717 (1956) ; IoWA CODE ANN. § 793.18 (1946) ;
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2308 (1956); N.Y. CODE CRM. PRoc. § 543(1). Under its
territorial laws, Hawaii also provided that appellate courts might reduce but could
not increase criminal sentences. HAWAI REv. LAws § 212-14 (1955).
1
9 CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 51-194 to -197 (1958). The English and Scottish

procedures also provide for review of criminal sentences on appeal, the reviewing
court having the power either to increase or reduce the original sentence. Criminal
Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, §4(3); Criminal Appeal (Scotland) Act, 1926,
16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 15, §2(4).
20
The contention that the sentence was excessive is mentioned as a ground
of appeal in thkrty-eight opinions of the Court of Criminal Appeals during the
year 1951. For a more extensive study of sentence reduction in the Oklahoma
court during the years 1939 through 1941, see Note, Due Process and Legislative
Standardsin Sentencing, 101 U. PA. L. Rxv. 257, 274 & n.109 (1952).
2
iJones v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 359, 236 P.2d 102 (1951) (admission of dying
declarations of victim may have prejudiced jury).
22 Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951).
23
Sukovaty v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 391, 236 P2d 696 (1951) (drunken driving;
first offense; no property destroyed and no one injured); Sykes v. State, 95 Okla.
Crim. 14, 238 P.2d 384 (1951) (illegal possession of intoxicating liquor; remarks of
county attorney may have influenced jury).
24
Tripp v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 231, 237 P,?d 171 (1951).
25 Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 56, 230 P.2d 495, 506 (1951).
26 Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 Atl. 733 (1932).
27
Commonwealth v. Irelan, 341 Pa. 43, 17 A.2d 897 (1941).
28 See generally von Moschzisker, Capital Punishmentin the Pennsylvania Courts,
20 PA. B.A.Q. 174 (1949).
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impulse of greed and desire" or whether it is the result of provocation or
impulse of emotion; 2 9 (2) whether the crime was committed in the perpetration of a felony; 30 (3) whether the crime was committed under the
influence of intoxication 3 1 or as a result of emotional stress; 32 (4) whether
the defendant was feeble-minded or was suffering from a "mental weakness"
short of that negating criminal responsibility; 33 (5) whether the "defendant was an habitual offender against society, who regularly engaged in
crimes of violence for mercenary purposes" 34 or whether he was of good
reputation and character; 35 (6) whether the defendant had had the opportunity for parental training, education or religious instruction; 3 6 and (7)
the age of the defendant.3 7 In addition, the court, in Commonwealth v.
3
Garramone,
8 had laid down a procedural requirement that, in capital cases,
"the judge who hears the evidence on a plea of guilty, should at least make
and file a brief memorandum which will reveal the reasons for the sentence
imposed."
The Green and Cater cases, proximate in time and similar in fact while
possessing significant differences in legal posture, presented to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania a unique opportunity to clarify and delineate the
scope of review of death sentences imposed by trial judges in cases of guilty
pleas.3 9 The paucity of cases in which sentences of death were successfully
challenged 40 had left unanswered important questions, such as: What
information must be in the record before the sentencing court? To what
extent must information, relevant only to the penalty, be proved by evidence? For what reasons will the court vacate a death sentence? And,
after a sentence has been vacated what is the proper disposition of the case?
While the position taken by the court in the Cater case seems clear, the
Green opinion unfortunately tends to obscure rather than to clarify the
answers to the questions posed above. The scope of appellate review of
capital sentences, as affected by the rulings in the Green and Cater cases,
may best be considered by positing a series of hypothetical situations in
which challenges to a sentence of death might be made. Where convenient,
29 See Commonwealth v. Harris, 314 Pa. 81, 85, 171 AtI. 279, 281 (1934);
Commonwealth v. Sterling, 314 Pa. 76, 170 Atl. 258 (1934).
3
0 See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa. 327, 184 Atl. 97 (1936).
31 See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949).
32
See Commonwealth v. Irelan, 341 Pa. 43, 17 A.2d 897 (1941).
33 See Commonwealth v. Taranow, 359 Pa. 342, 59 A.2d 53 (1948); Commonwealth v. Howell, 338 Pa. 577, 13 A.2d 521 (1940) ; Commonwealth v. Hawk, 328 Pa.
417, 196 At. 5 (1938).
34 See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa. 327, 331, 184 At. 97, 99 (1936).
3
5 See Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 Atl. 733 (1932).
30
See Commonwealth v. Pepperman, 353 Pa. 373, 45 A.2d 35 (1946).
3
7 See Commonwealth v. Zietz, 364 Pa. 294, 72 A.2d 282 (1950).
38307 Pa. 507, 514, 161 Atl. 733, 735 (1932).
39
For a discussion of the issues raised by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
apparent refusal to review sentences imposed by juries, see von Moschzisker, mupra
note 28, at 174 n.1.
40 Commonwealth v. Irelan, 341 Pa. 43, 17 A.2d 897 (1941) ; Commonwealth v.
Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 Atl. 733 (1932).
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the crucial factors on which the decision in the Green case turned-the
defendant's age, mentality and background-will be used to illustrate these
situations.
Case 1: Defendant, after entering a plea of guilty, is convicted of
murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. No evidence as to his
age, mentality and background is introduced and the statements of the
judges 41 are silent as to these issues. At first impression, this is the situa42
However, the
tion which the Green opinion would seem to describe.
evidence as to
it
before
record shows that the lower court did in fact have
43
Still, although for this
the defendant's age, mentality and background.
reason Green can not be regarded as speaking directly to the situation of
a record utterly devoid of evidence as to relevant sentencing factors, the
narrowest possible reading of the case must suppose a requirement in this
regard that goes beyond the court's earlier statement that the sentencing
body "is entitled to be informed of all circumstances and conditions properly
to be regarded as relevant to the determination of the penalty." 44 For if
Green imposes upon the court an even more stringent procedural rulethat the sentencing court must consider, not merely be aware of, the defendant's age, mentality and background 41-it necessarily affirms sub silentio
the preliminary requisite that evidence as to these factors must be before
the court. It would therefore seem that if information relevant to the
sentence is excluded or is not presented to the court, and if the court makes
no inquiry 46 in search of such information, the imposition of the death
penalty would be an abuse of discretion. It would also seem plain that the
proper disposition of such a case on appeal would be to vacate the sentence
41 See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
42

"On the record there is no evidence of the background of this boy; his home
environment, the economic circumstances under which he was reared, his scholastic
record; in short, what was this boy . . . really like prior to the commission of this
crime? Of these things the court below was without knowledge and made no
inquiry." 396 Pa. at 149-50, 151 A.2d at 247.
43
Record, pp. 165-67. Testimony showed that the defendant was fifteen years
of age, that his mother had been in a tuberculosis sanitarium for a year prior to
the commission of the crime, that his intelligence quotient was 80, that he had gone
to the ninth grade in school, that he had previously been sent to the Glen Mills School
(a reform school). For a more comprehensive and detailed summary of testimony
as to the defendant's age, mentality and background, see Justice Bell's dissent, 396
Pa. 137, 151, 151 A.2d 241, 249. Although some language in the majority opinion
might support a view that the court regarded the evidence which was presented as
not sufficiently comprehensive-that the court was in effect ruling that more detailed
facts as to the defendant's home life and school record would be required-the disposition of the case tends to refute that interpretation inasmuch as, on the basis of
the same record available to the trial court, the Supreme Court itself proceeded to
impose a penalty of life imprisonment.
44 Commonwealth v. Woodling, 355 Pa. 555, 559, 50 A.2d 328, 329 (1947).
(Emphasis added.)
45See notes 48-52 infra and accompanying text.
46The opinion in the Green case implies that if no evidence is presented by
defense counsel, the court itself is under a duty to make an inquiry to ascertain background information relevant to sentencing. See note 42 supra.
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and remand the case to the lower court for further hearing on the penalty
47
and resentencing.
Case 2: Defendant is convicted of first degree murder and is sentenced
to death following a plea of guilty. Evidence as to his age, mentality and
background is presented to the court but the judges, in their statements of
the reasons for the sentence imposed, fail to state that they have considered
this evidence. The record of the Green case reveals that this was its posture
when appeal was taken to the supreme court; 48 furthermore, the court's
opinion speaks primarily in terms of an abuse of discretion in that the lower
49
court failed to consider the defendant's age, mentality and background.
Viewed in this light, the Green case is implemented by the Garramone
requirement of a memorandum of reasons for the sentence imposed: 50
Green requires that the court consider the defendant's age, mentality and
background while the statement required by Garramone aids the reviewing
court in ascertaining whether these factors have actually been taken into
account. The result is a procedure, compliance with which may be reviewed
on appeal, to insure that all factors relevant to the penalty will be before
and considered by the sentencing tribunal. The role of the reviewing court
is two-fold: first, to enunciate those factors which must, and those circumstances which may, be considered in imposing sentence 51 and, second, to
review cases in which the death penalty has been imposed to insure that the
required factors have been considered. Under such a scheme, its scope of
review is limited to procedural issues-that is, to the question of whether
the discretion lodged in the lower court has been "judicially exercised." 52
And if the supreme court, having found that consideration of a requisite
factor has been omitted, is to avoid the substantive question of "whether
the appellate court would have imposed the same penalty as .

.

. the

court below," 53 the proper disposition of the case is to vacate the sentence
and remand to the lower court for consideration of the omitted factor, to be
47f the record is bare with regard to factors which must be considered by the
sentencing tribunal, it is difficult to justify an outright reduction of sentence by the
supreme court. Without this evidence the reviewing court obviously can make no
more judicial a determination than could the lower court whose failure to be apprised
of those factors is the sole rationale for the upsetting of its decision on appeal.
48
See note 43 supra. While one sentencing judge stated that, because of the
defendant's age, he concurred in the penalty imposed only with "great reluctance"
(Record, p. 198), the other two judges made little or no reference to the factors
which the supreme court considered crucial.
49 396 Pa. at 147-50, 151 A.2d at 247-48.
50 See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
51 The term "background" as used by the court in the Green case probably includes at least those factors discussed in the text accompanying notes 29-37 supra
which relate to the defendant's past history. For the court's own elaboration on the
background requirement with specific reference to Green, see note 42 supra.
52
Commonwealth v. Howell, 338 Pa. 577, 580, 13 A.2d 521, 522 (1940). (Emphasis added.)
53 Commonwealth v. Gossard, 383 Pa. 239, 243, 117 A.2d 902, 904 (1955).
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followed by resentencing. In Green, however, the disposition was to remand
with directions that the defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment.5 4 This
disposition indicates that the scope of appellate review, at least as that scope
is defined by Green, may be broader than the mere implementation of the
procedural safeguard of insuring that the lower court has considered all
relevant factors in imposing sentence. 55
Case 3: Defendant pleads guilty to murder generally and is found guilty
of that crime in the first degree. Uncontradicted evidence in the record
tends to show that the defendant had, prior to the crime, led a law-abiding
and sober life. The judge, however, in sentencing the defendant to death,
states as his reason for imposing that sentence that he found the defendant's
background to be that of a chronic alcoholic who was given to periods of
viciousness and who had devoted his life primarily to criminal activities of
various types. This situation is analogous to that presented on appeal in
the Cater case 56 where the court cited in support of its reasons for the death
sentence certain statements from the confession of Williams which it mistakenly applied to all three defendants. This third case is somewhat the
reverse of the situation presented in the second hypothetical example above:
there, evidence though presented was not considered; here, the considerations on which the death sentence was imposed would be valid were they
supported by evidence. 57 It is interesting to note that in Cater the court
delicately avoided the substantive question of whether a death sentence could
properly be imposed based on other evidence presented,5 8 and instead
remanded the case to the lower court for resentencing. Indeed, it appears
that the Cater record contained much more evidence relevant to the penalty
than did the Green record; 59 if this be true, the supreme court could more
easily have passed on the issue of penalty in the former case than in the
latter. The outright reduction in Green, therefore, is difficult to reconcile
54
Mr. Justice Bell, dissenting, wrote: "the most the majority could do, even
under their analysis of the record and their novel theory of the law, would be to
remand the case for further investigation and possible resentencing by the lower
Court." 396 Pa. at 155, 151 A.2d at 250.
55 See notes 61-67 infra and accompanying text.
56 See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
57 The decision is in accord with cases from other jurisdictions where sentences
had been imposed based on findings not supported by sufficient evidence. See note 9
supra and accompanying text.
58
"We cannot say that any or all of these factual errors influenced the court
below in its decision to impose the death sentence upon both Cater and Rivers. But,
we must agree with counsel for these appellants that we cannot say that if the court
had properly viewed the evidence it might not have reached a different conclusion
as to the appropriate penalty." 396 Pa. at 182, 152 A.2d at 264.

59 Compare the portion of the Greet opinion quoted in note 42 supra with the
court's statement in Cater that evidence was presented "describing the defendants'
background. Rivers, age 18, Cater, age 19, and Williams, age 20, were reared in
unstable homes under unfavorable socio-environmental conditions. Each had made
only minimal scholastic progress, and, according to a report of a psychiatrist, Rivers
was not only mentally deficient but also mentally ill." 396 Pa. at 175, 152 A.2d at 261.
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with the implication of Cater that consideration by the supreme court of
the substantive issues regarding the penalty is undesirable.60
Case 4: Defendant, having pleaded guilty to murder, is found guilty of
murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. Procedurally, the sentence is without error; 61 however, the circumstances surrounding the crime
and the age, mentality and background of the criminal are such that a sentence of death is manifestly inappropriate for the case. This is the situation
63
62
which was presented to the supreme court in the Garramone and Irelan
cases, where the court reduced the death sentences imposed by the lower
court to life imprisonment. Until Green, in only these two cases had the
court reviewed the substantive correctness of a penalty and concluded that
reduction of sentence was necessary; whether the court reached that same
conclusion in Green or reduced for some other reason is unclear. Green,
unlike either Garramone or Irelan, killed in the attempted perpetration of a
robbery; under the circumstances the imposition of the death penalty on
Green is certainly less shocking to the public and judicial consciences than
was the sentence of death passed on Garramone or Irelan. And, considering the language of the Cater opinion handed down on the same day,,
it seems unlikely that the supreme court was exercising for Green's benefit
a power which had lain dormant for eighteen years since the decision of the
Irelan case. It does not appear, then, that the reduction in Green was the
result of a substantive review of the Garramone-Irelantype. Two other
possible explanations are suggested for the reduction of sentence in Green.
First, the opinion might perhaps be interpreted as saying that there was no
difference, substantial enough to justify a distinction in punishment, between
the age, mentality and background of Green and of his two co-felons who
were sentenced to life imprisonment. Indeed, this was essentially the
argument presented to the court by appellant. 65 However, if Green is read
60 "[W]hile we do not substitute our judgment for that of the sentencing court,
we look to see in every capital case whether the trial court abused its discretion by
overlooking pertinent facts or disregarding the force of evidence, or erred in its
law." Commonwealth v. Cater, 396 Pa. 172, 180, 152 A.2d 259, 263.
61 That is to say, evidence as to relevant factors is in the record; the sentencing
judge has stated his reasons for imposing the death sentence and those reasons are
supported by evidence.
62
The court
Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 Atl. 733 (1932).

stated as its reasons for reduction: "This is the case of an industrious man without
criminal record, whose character as a peaceful law-abiding citizen was testified
to by a number of persons. After he returned from his day's work and found his
wife and son in the condition described, he committed the crime under the resulting
provocation, and in circumstances, which, we think, place him within the legislative
classification requiring the milder of two possible sentences. The imposition of a
sentence of death, instead of life imprisonment, was such an abuse of discretion as to
require modification by resentence." Id. at 514, 161 Atl. at 735.
63 Commonwealth v. Irelan, 341 Pa. 43, 17 A.2d 897 (1941) (infanticide resulting from
conditions of extreme poverty and social degradation).
64
See note 60 mipra.
65 Brief for Appellant, p. 12: "There is no legally logical reason for this boy
to receive death when the two other boys, who were equally as guilty under the

law, received life imprisonment."
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in this manner, it is difficult to understand why, with the argument before it,
the court did not make explicit the grounds of its reduction-equalization
of punishment for offenders of approximately equal age, mentality and
background. 66 Second, it is possible that the Green reduction was motivated
by the fact that, since the sentence was passed, one of the sentencing judges
had left the bench to run for political office 67 and a remand without specific
directions would have made necessary a complete rehearing on the penalty.
If this is the basis of reduction, the case is not unlike those from other
jurisdictions where, in the presence of extraordinary circumstances, the
reviewing court has remanded an illegal sentence with specific directions as
to the sentence to be imposed.68 Under either explanation, however, it
seems clear that the supreme court was unwilling to exercise the Garramone69
Irelan type of substantive review.

While the effort to establish procedural safeguards for defendants
faced with the possibility of capital punishment is indeed significant and
commendable, the effort falls far short of the criminological goal of a consistent and rationalized sentencing policy. The court has indicated that it
will not review the discretion exercised by a jury in selecting the penalty
of death or life imprisonment.7 0
66

And the absence of substantive review of

In Oklahoma, equalization of punishment among co-criminals is a frequent
ground for reduction of sentence by the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Note,
Due Process and Legislative Standards in Sentencing, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 257, 274
& n.109 (1952).
67Judge John Morgan Davis was elected Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania
in November 1958.
68 See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
69 If equalization of sentence had been stated as a basis for reduction in Green,
the way would be open for a limited type of substantive review where two or more
criminals, of equivalent or relatively equivalent backgrounds, received differing
sentences for their participation in the same crime. It is possible that the court's
opinion was written in the language of procedural review to foreclose the equalization
of sentence argument in the future while at the same time giving Green the benefit
of the equalization principle. The Green and Cater cases taken together seem to
eliminate consideration of substantive issues of any type in future appellate review
of sentences.
70 See note 17 supra and accompanying text. The courts appear to be extremely
reluctant to interfere with a penalty which has been set by a jury; and often the jury
is given no significant legal guidance whatsoever with regard to the selection of one
sentence over another. See, e.g., People v. Brice, 49 Cal. 2d 434, 437, 317 P.2d 961,
962 (1957), where the court stated that "regardless of the circumstances connected
with a murder of the first degree, there is no requirement of or preference for either
of the applicable penalties . . . the selection of punishment is in every instance
completely within the absolute discretion of the jury." It may be argued that sentences imposed by juries are more likely to be irrational and inconsistent than are
those imposed by courts, which must often make public their reasons for the sentence
imposed. If this be true, should not appellate courts police sentences imposed by
juries even more strictly than those decided upon by courts? An even more logical
solution would be entirely to remove the function of deciding upon sentences from
the area of the jury's deliberations.
Of course tenable arguments may be advanced in support of preserving the
discretion of the jury with regard to the imposition of the death sentence. A first
would proceed from the premise that such discretion is necessary and desirable in
order to prevent jury nullification-that is, from the danger that the jury, though convinced of the propriety of a verdict of first degree murder, might yet hesitate to
speak that verdict in apprehension of the defendant's being sentenced to death by
some other sentencing body. Another argument reasons that the jury, as the repre-
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sentences places the consistency of their imposition solely on the premise
that different courts, sentencing different offenders in different places at
different times, will arrive at like and uniformly fair conclusions provided
only that they make a "full and exhaustive inquiry into both the criminal
act and the criminal himself," 71 considering the age, mentality and background of the defendant in imposing sentence. On the other hand, it is
doubtful that it is the function of appellate courts, even if they were willing
to perform that function, 7 2 to establish any "fixed and immutable standard
for juries or trial courts in appraising death in one instance and life imprisonment in the other as the appropriate penalty for first degree murder." 73 The function of prescribing standards for the imposition of punishment logically rests with the legislature. In establishing the alternative
punishments of death and life imprisonment for first degree murder rather
than setting down one mandatory punishment, the legislature must have
considered that some classes of offenders would deserve the greater penalty
while others would be more properly sentenced to undergo the lesser.74
The very provision of alternatives presupposes a rational means of distinguishing between those alternatives. But the legislature has failed to
prescribe criteria to guide courts and juries in making that distinction. The
situation is one in which immense power is delegated to courts and juries
with no standards for the exercise of that power; the result is that appellate
courts have often been forced to acquiesce in possibly prejudiced and irra75
tional choices between the alternatives.
sentative of the community, should have the final word as to which murderers should
be irrevocably removed from that community. While the problem of nullification
especially is not an unreal one, the weight of this consideration does not seem
sufficient to overcome other problems (qualification of the jurors, admission at the
trial on guilt of evidence relevant only to the penalty, proper instructions by the
court on the issue of penalty, and propriety of appellate review of the jury's discretion) which are raised when discretion is lodged in the jury. For an excellent
discussion of those problems and others, see Knowlton, Problens of Jury Discretion
in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1099 (1953). Knowlton also points out that
among the advantages of lodging the sentencing function in the court is that sentencing
would be performed by an experienced group, the members of which were aware
of the legal and criminological purposes of punishment.
71 Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. at 148, 151 A.2d at 247.
72
Generally, courts have been reluctant to develop any type of guiding principles in the area of sentencing. ". . . [W]hile in murder cases there is frequent
reference to 'mitigating' or 'extenuating' circumstances, no tribunal, as far as I know,
has ever attempted to express the reasoning which leads to a conclusion as to just
• . . what factors in such cases should incline a jury or a court to imposition of
the one penalty as against the other. The entire subject seems to be one of an
" Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 285, 288-89 (0. & T.
uncharted sea ....
1930). This reluctance seems to stem from a feeling that the question of sentencing
standards is penological in its nature, more suitable for legislative than for judicial
determination. "Whatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment, whether one believes in its efficacy or its futility . . . these are peculiarly
questions of legislative policy." Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958).
73 Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 534, 50 A.2d 317, 323 (1947).
74 "The Legislature, in its wisdom and mercy, recognized that murder of the
first degree should not always be punished by death." Commonwealth v. Irelan, 341
Pa. 43, 47, 17 A.2d 897, 898 (1941).
75 See Wilson v. State, 268 Ala. 86, 105 So. 2d 66 (1958) (sentence of death
for $1.96 robbery affirmed): Ryall v. State, 321 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tenn. 1958)
("It must be conceded that the punishment imposed is rather drastic, but this Court
• . . has no power to reduce the sentence.").
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If consistency and rationality are to be instilled into sentencing procedures, 76 it is necessary, especially in potentially capital cases,77 that the
legislatures prescribe criteria for the election of the one punishment over
its alternative. Undoubtedly in any sentencing procedure which preserves
a system of court-imposed sentences, 78 the judge must retain some measure
of discretion in selecting the sentence within broad classes established by
the legislature; in view of the court's means of acquiring essential information as to the defendant's background and mental make-up 79 and the judge's
contact with the defendant during the trial or hearing, only the judge is able
to individualize treatment so that the punishment may be appropriate to both
the crime and the criminal. On the other hand, as wide an area of discretion as is found in the sentencing process today is unrealistic; to say that
a judge must have discretion in sentencing certainly does not preclude the
legislature from laying down criteria limiting his discretion or from enunciating factors which must be properly considered in exercising that limited
discretion.80
The legislative task of formulating a penological policy and of prescribing criteria for sentencing is by no means an easy one. In establishing
criteria which limit judicial discretion by typing classes of offenders for
70
n contrast to the lack of legislatively established criteria for sentencing in
American jurisdictions, such criteria, set forth in terms of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, are contained in many European codes. George, Al Ulnsolved Problem: Comparative Sentencing Techniques, 45 A.B.A.J. 250, 251 (1959). The only
American experiment in defining sentencing standards is found in Iowa legislation
of the last century. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances were set out in the
Codes of 1851 and 1860 but were omitted from the 1873 revision. Iowa Code §§ 4875-77
(1860); Iowa Code §§ 3067-69 (1851). Factors to be weighed in mitigation were
youth, senility, influence toward the crime by someone "superior" to the offender,
commission of the crime under a misapprehension of duty, provocation. Aggravating
circumstances were that the offender was an officer charged with preventing the
commission of the offense, that the offender was a public officer or a public figure,
that the crime was premeditated in conspiracy with others, that the offender induced
others to join with him in crime, that the crime entailed a breach of trust or moral
duty other than that necessarily broken in the commission of the offense, that the
victim was treated with wanton cruelty or was incapable of resistance, that the
general character of the offender showed such passions and vices as would incline
him to commit the crime.
77 This discussion, though dealing with the alternative punishments of death
and life imprisonment, is by and large equally applicable to sentences for a term
of years. Thus, where the statutory penalty is fixed at a maximum of twenty years,
the legislature would prescribe criteria for the imposition of a greater or lesser term
within the statutory maximum.

78 See WEIHoFEN, TE URGE To PuNisH 128 (1956), where it is pointed out

that a system of sentencing wherein the convicted defendant is turned over to a
tribunal of experts to be sentenced is not likely to be established in the foreseeable
future. Weihofen also suggests that any such "expert" system would run afoul of
constitutional limitations and that from a psychological point of view it might be
wise to retain a system of judge-imposed sentences.
79
Pre-sentence reports and behavior clinic reports are typical means by which
the court may secure information concerning the mentality and background of the
defendant to aid it in imposing sentence.
8oA distinction must be drawn between categorical prerequisites-whereby the
legislature directs that a defendant shall not be sentenced to punishment x unless
the court finds that factor a is present-and considerations-whereby the legislature
directs the court to consider factor b in imposing sentence. The former limit discretion; the latter guide its exercise.
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greater or lesser punishments without unduly restricting individualization of
penal treatment, however, the legislature may look to the examples of
8
European codes which have experimented with such criteria l and to the
preliminary efforts of the American Law Institute in the formulation of the
Model Penal Code.82 And in stating considerations which may properly
guide judicial discretion within the classes thus delineated, the legislature
may draw on the experience of states such as Pennsylvania in which courts
have stated factors which may properly be taken into account in the imposition of punishment.
Applying these general outlines of the legislative task to the Pennsylvania situation with regard to the alternative punishments for murder
of the first degree, it is suggested that, in order to remedy the practical
absence of substantive review of death sentences s1 and the inconsistencies
and inequities in the sentencing process resulting from that absence, section
701 of the Penal Code8 4 might be amended in several respects. A proposed
statute embodying the suggested amendments is presented below. The
reasons for the amendments, insofar as they have not been explained above,
are noted in the commentary after the statute.8 5
Whoever is convicted of the crime of murder of the first degree is guilty
of a felony and shall be sentenced by the court to undergo imprisonment
for life, unless the court shall find
(1)

that the offender has previously been convicted of two or more
crimes endangering the lives or persons of others, which
crimes were committed at different times when he was over
eighteen (18) years of age; or

(2) that the killing was planned substantially in advance of its
commission, and was committed for mercenary motives or in
81 See DANISH CRIMINAL CODE arts. 83, 84 (1958); CRIMINAL STATUTES OF
JAPAN arts. 36-39, 42 (1957); ITALIAN PENAL CODE arts. 61, 62 (1930), and
R.S.F.S.R. PENAL CODE arts. 47, 48, 136, 142 (1926) (U.S.S.R.), translated in
MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 1300-01, 1308-09

(1940). [Subsequent references to the Italian and Russian Penal Codes are from
MIcHAEL & WECHSLER, Op. cit. supra.] See also George, mspra note 76.
82 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Criteria for Withholding Sentence of Imprisonment and for Placing Defendant on Probation); § 7.03 (Criteria for Sentence of
Extended Term of Imprisonment, Felonies); § 7.04 (Criteria for Sentence of Extended Term of Imprisonment, Misdemeanors and Petty Misdemeanors) (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1954).
83 See text accompanying notes 64-69 supra.
84
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4701 (1945).
85
This draft statute is intended to exemplify the general type of legislative
mechanism which might practically be employed to cope with the sentencing problem.
The draft necessarily must make a series of assumptions with regard to the appropriate substantive law of sentencing. While it is believed that the assumptions here
made are normatively preferable, disagreement as to what kinds or degrees of
penalty should be attached to a range of criminal behavior patterns would not preclude agreement on the practicality or desirability of a particular institutional mechanism for the implementation of whatever substantive sentencing policies ultimately
receive legislative approval. Portions of the current Pennsylvania statute included
unchanged in the draft amendment are printed in italics.
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order to conceal or benefit from the previous commission of
another offense or to facilitate the commission of a substantially simultaneous offense; or
(3)

that the offense was committed while the offender was serving a sentence of imprisonment for life imposed upon a previous conviction of murder of the first degree.

Such a finding shall be supported by substantial evidence. If the court
shall find any of the circumstances stated in subsections (1) through
(3) above, it shall, at its discretion, sentence the defendant to undergo
imprisonment for life or to suffer death in the manner provided by law.
In fixing the penalty at death or life imprisonment, the court shall
consider
(1) the previous criminal record, if any, of the defendant;
(2) mental defects or deficiencies, if any, of the defendant;
(3) the provocation or emotional stress, if any, which attended
the commission of the crime;
(4) the opportunity of the defendant for parental training and
education;
(5) the state of intoxication or narcotics addiction of the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime; and
(6) any other factors in the defendant's background which may
be relevant to the penalty to be imposed.
Where the court shall sentence any person to suffer death, it shall
state in writing the reasons for which such sentence was imposed.
Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this section, no person convicted of murder of the first degree shall be sentenced to suffer death
if such person was less than eighteen years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime. The clerk of the court wherein any defendant is sentenced to suffer death shall, within ten days after such sentence of death, transmit a full and complete record of the trial and
conviction to the Governor.
The suggested amendments completely remove the function of fixing
the sentence from the hands of the jury. The secret deliberations of a jury,
much as they may be appropriate for a finding of guilt or innocence, are
irreconcilable with an effort to secure a consistent application of the death
penalty based upon open and rational considerations." 6 The selection of the
penalty is therefore left to the court to be made after the jury has concluded
its deliberations on the question of guilt. A second advantage of this proposed change is that evidence which may be relevant to the penalty but not
86 See note 70 supra.
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to guilt need not be presented in the trial of the latter issue; the question
of guilt or innocence may be decided without the confusing and possibly
87
prejudicial effect of evidence relevant only to penalty.
The proposed statute clearly expresses a preference for the penalty
of life imprisonment, thus stressing the goal of rehabilitation rather than
the desire for retribution. On the other hand, it recognizes that there may
be certain cases in which the death penalty may be appropriate. The requirement that the court make affirmative findings of certain aggravating
circumstances before the death sentence may be imposed is an attempt to
restrict the imposition of a penalty to offenders who are likely to be a threat
to the safety of any person with whom they associate whether inside or
outside of prison walls. The presence of any one of the aggravating circumstances indicates that the offender places an extremely low value on
human life. The first aggravating circumstance delineates offenders who
three times have shown their disregard for the safety and bodily integrity of
others through the commission of crimes of violence.88 The second aggravating circumstance singles out those who value life so slightly that they will
calculate in advance to take it in order to secure money or to conceal some
previous or further some simultaneous illegal exploit; 89 the requirement
that the killing be planned substantially in advance of its commission prevents the death penalty from becoming automatically available in robberymurder cases where the killing may result from the excitement of the
The third aggravating
moment or from fear of immediate apprehension."
circumstance 91 delineates a class of persons whose behavior has, as to themselves, tended to invalidate the theory upon which the legislative mandate
of life imprisonment was laid down-that such persons, if allowed to live,
might be rehabilitated and live without threatening danger to others.
Even if the court finds that any of the aggravating circumstances is
present, the death sentence is not automatically imposed; the presence of
these circumstances merely indicates that the court may, in its discretion,
sentence to death whereas their absence means that the court must sentence
to imprisonment for life. Vesting this measure of discretion in the court
87 The Pennsylvania statute providing for a separate presentation of evidence on
the question of penalty eliminates the problem of confusion of evidence in that state.
Pa. Laws 1959, act 594. This objection, however, is still valid in several other states,
and, in Pennsylvania, the more basic objection to the current scheme-that of the
jury's inconsistency and irrationality in fixing the penalty-remains.
See also
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
88 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.03(1)
Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 6.
s9 Aggravating circumstances based upon the motive of the criminal are frequent in European codes. See, e.g., ITALIAN PENAL CODE arts. 61(1) (having acted
for base or trivial motives), and 61(2) (to conceal another offense); R.S.F.S.R.
PENAL CODE arts. 47(a) (with the object of restoring the power of the bourgeoisie)
and 47(d) (mercenary or other base motives).
90 Compare Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 5(a) ("in the course or
furtherance of theft").
91
Compare DANISH CRIMINAL CODE art. 83 (1958), which provides for increased penalties for certain offenses if they are committed by a prisoner while serving
a sentence or while kept in custody for some other reason.
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is essential to eliminate inequities which are likely to result from an automatic application of the death sentence resulting from the finding of the
legislatively decreed circumstances of aggravation. Even where discretion
is allowed, however, the statute provides guidance for the exercise of that
discretion by enumerating certain factors which must at least be considered.
In this respect, the statute largely adopts the system of mandatory considerations judicially developed in the Garramone and Green cases. The
open-ended catch-all clause in subsection (6) provides for the possibility
of further judicial enunciation of factors which may, in certain cases, be
considered relevant to the penalty. The requirement that the court state
in writing the reasons for the imposition of a death sentence codifies the
"brief memorandum" concept of the Garramone case. It is contemplated
that appellate review will be available both in cases where the finding of an
aggravating circumstance is not supported by sufficient evidence and also in
cases where the sentencing court has abused its discretion by failing to
consider facts pertinent to the penalty after a substantiated finding of aggravation is made.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-WRIT OF PRoHrBiTioN ISSUED DisCHARGING

GRAwD

JuRY

CoxvENED

To IwvEsTiGATE

CRimTNAL

ACTIVITIES OF LocAL LABOR UNIoN
On the district attorney's petition in criminal court to convene a special
grand jury for investigative purposes, alleging that officers, agents, and
members of a local labor union had been engaged in wide-spread criminal
activities, that they had been investigated by a congressional committee and
independently by the district attorney, that specific crimes had been committed,' that those crimes affected the public health, welfare, safety, and
morals, and that such systematic criminal activities could not be properly
investigated by ordinary law enforcement means,2 petition was granted and
the grand jury convened.3 Members of the local union petitioned the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for a writ of prohibition to compel the local
judge to discharge the grand jury and terminate the proceeding. Issuing
the writ, the supreme court held that the district attorney's petition was
1E.g., fraudulent issuance of a forged check, assault and battery and conspiracy
to commit blackmail, assault and battery, threats to do bodily harm and larceny.
In each instance the time and place of the transaction and individual perpetrators and
victims were named. Petition of the District Attorney, Philadelphia County, For a
Special Grand Jury Investigation, Court of Quarter Sessions, Philadelphia County,
Pa., Sept. 1, 1959, pp. 4-6.
2 No specific explanation for the asserted incapacity of normal means of criminal
administration was offered.
8 Order for a Special Grand Jury Investigation, Court of Quarter Sessions, Philadelphia County, Pa., In the Matter of the Petition of the District Attorney of Philadelphia County, Sept. 3, 1959.
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insufficient in that it failed to show, first, that there was a public emergency
and, second, that the usual law enforcement agencies were unable to cope
with the problem. 4 In re Petition of Grace, 397 Pa. 254, 154 A.2d 592

(1959).
The investigative function of the grand jury exists as a discrete adjunct
of the jury's traditional purpose of returning indictments-based upon
charges made before a committing magistrate, founded upon probable cause,
and supported by oath or affirmation-against individuals accused of specific
crimes. 5 This function supplements that of ordinary law enforcement
agencies. 6 Aside from Pennsylvania, most jurisdictions permit the district
attorney to direct the inquiry 7 without prior judicial approval or charge
limiting its scope; 8 the field of investigation is restricted only by the juris9
Since the
dictional limits of the court to which the jury is appended.
prosecutor in most states lacks the power of subpoena,-' and since magistrates although empowered to subpoena cannot of their own motion conduct
general investigations beyond the confines of the specific charge before
them,"' the investigative grand jury is a most useful means of inquiry into
criminal activities.' 2 However, the very broadness of this inquisitorial
13
To the extent that the existence
power renders it susceptible of abuse.
4
Mr. Justice Bok wrote for the three-justice majority. Two justices dissented,
while the remaining justices did not take part in the decision.
5 See, e.g., Maley v. District Court, 221 Iowa 732, 266 N.W. 815 (1936); State v.
166 S.C. 323, 164 S.E. 873 (1932).
Bramlett,
6
See generally, Dession & Cohen, The InuisitorialFunctions of Grand Juries,
41 YALE L.J. 687 (1932) ; Kidd, Why Grand Jury's Power Is a Menace to Organised
Crime, 12 PANEL 325 (1934); Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE.
L. Rxv. 101, 217, 295 (1931); Nahum & Schatz, The Grand Jury in Connecticut,
5 CoNr. B.J. 111 (1931). But see McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 58, 187 Atl. 498,
503 (1938) (restrictive view of investigative grand juries).
7 See, e.g., State v. Coulter, 104 Miss. 764, 61 So. 706 (1913) ; Gitchell v. People,
146 Ill. 175, 33 N.E. 757 (1893) (dictum).
8 "[T]he power and duty of the grand jury to investigate is original and complete . . . not therefore dependent for its exertion upon the approval or disapproval of the court." United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 413 (1920). See
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 280 (1919) : "At the foundation of our Federal
Government the inquisitorial function of the grand jury and the compulsion of witnesses were recognized as incidents of the judicial power of the United States." See
also 39 CAL. L. REv. 573 (1951).
9 See, e.g., People v. Northey, 77 Cal. 618 (1888); People v. Ruttles, 172 Misc.
306, 14 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
'ofDession & Cohen, supra note 6, at 689.
'Id. at 689-90.
12 See, e.g., People v. Conzo, 301 Ill. App. 524, 23 N.E.2d 210 (1939) ; Ex parte
Jennings, 91 Tex. Crim. 612, 240 S.W. 942 (1922). But see Kerby v. Long, 116
Ga. 187, 42 S.E. 386 (1902); Ingels v. Washington, 4 Wash. 2d 476, 104 P.2d 944
(1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 708 (1940).
13 See, e.g., McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 58, 187 Atl. 498, 503 (1936): "Our
courts, mindful of the danger that this body might, if unrestrained and unguided,
encroach upon the very liberties which it was created to protect, have imposed
definite limitations upon its investigatorial powers. . . . The jury may, through
the court, subpoena books, papers, witnesses and subject them to examination. Its
powers are vastly broader than a committing magistrate's. Its concern being of things
rather than individuals, the scope of its investigation is very wide, including all the
ramifications of the subject investigated and extending to all who may be brought
within the field of culpability."
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of specific crimes or the identity of specific individuals ultimately to be
prosecuted is unknown, the investigation may operate as a spreading
criminal dragnet. On the other hand, where the persons suspected of
indictable conduct are known from the outset, the secret proceedings of the
jury-not formally aimed at individuals but at the occurrence of putative
criminal action-may be exploited to circumvent procedural safeguards
normally attendant upon prosecution. 14 The suspect may find himself
under indictment without the judicial screening, notice and confrontation
of a prior magistrate's hearing. 15 Or, without being informed of his right
to counsel or even that he is an interested party in the affair, he may be
compelled to attend as a witness and make revelations upon which a
presentment may be returned against him. Further, great expense and
inconvenience may be forced on the witness ordered to produce a myriad
of documents; nor is the stigmatizing notoriety which customarily attaches
to the subjects of investigation an inconsiderable instrument of harm.
Recognizing early the "fitness and propriety of the ordinary mode
of criminal procedure" 1'and the dangers, in departing from it, of encroachment upon liberties of constitutional dimension, 17 the leading Pennsylvania
decision Case of Lloyd & Carpenter'8 declared of what it termed the "extraordinary modes" 19 that their pursuit was justified only "under special circumstances or pressing emergencies." 2 0 Three such modes were detailed,
each of which has since developed as a separate institution: 21 preferment of
indictment by the prosecution without previous binding over or commitment
22
in cases where less prompt procedures might allow escape of the accused;
See Dession & Cohen, .spra note 6, at 691.
15 See, e.g., Case of Lloyd & Carpenter, 3 Clark 188, 195 (Pa. Quarter Sess.
14

1845).

16 Id. at 191-92.
17" 'The people,' says the Declaration of Rights, 'shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and
no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things, shall issue without
decribing them, as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation.' In all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right to be heard
by himself and his counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and to meet the witnesses face to face. These are solemn asservations of the
fundamental principle of civil liberty, admonishing those charged with the administration of justice, that while the Commonwealth demands the vigorous execution
of her humane criminal code, she seeks not its vindication, at the expense of the
just rights of her citizens." Id. at 189-90.
18 3 Clark 188 (Pa. Quarter Sess. 1845).
19 Id. at 192.

20 Ibid.
2

Because these three separate institutions were originally described in terms
which might conceivably have been read as regarding a single institution with three
different modes of initiation, there was for a time some confusion as to whether the
same or different legal principles applied. See Commonwealth v. Green, 126 Pa.
531, 17 AtI. 878 (1889) ; Rowand v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. 405 (1876) ; McCullough
v. Commonwealth, 67 Pa. 30 (1870).
22 Cf. Rowand v. Commonwealth, supra note 21, where an indictment returned
"ignoramus" by one grand jury and re-submitted, without a binding-over or commitment of the accused, to a second grand jury, was upheld. It was assumed without
finding that the trial judge had approved the prosecutor's action and that the requisite
emergency was present
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return sua sponte by the grand jury of a presentment based on its own
4
knowledge; 23 and convening by a criminal court, upon its own motion 2
or upon petition of a prosecuting officer, 25 of a grand jury to investigate
"matters of general public import, which, from their nature and operation
in the entire community, justify such intervention" 20-a jury which has
power also to return presentments founded upon its observation from the
testimony of witnesses, 21 so long as the presentment is within the scope of its
investigation.28 By this formula the jury, hedged with the procedural requirements of precedent judicial authorization and strict limitation of power
to the bounds of that authorization, is subjected as well to severe substantive restrictions as to the conditions of its convention. These conditions
were enumerated most succinctly in McNair'sPetition:29 it must sufficiently
appear that the investigation sought has (1) a definite purpose,30 (2) to
discover criminal acts, 31 (3) "which seriously affect or injure the public
generally, which effect, if permitted to continue, would endanger public
safety . . . or health, demoralize the personal security of members of

the public, or permit systematic criminal depredations by public officers
. The acts to be inquired into must (4) involve "criminal conspiracy, systematic violations of the law or other criminal acts of a widespread nature," 33 rather than ordinary crimes or crimes attributable to
known individuals; they must (5) demand immediate attention; they must
(6) be such that "the ordinary process of the law is inadequate to cope
with or discover them"; 34 and (7) of their commission the court must
have "direct knowledge or knowledge gained from trustworthy informa23 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Green, 126 Pa. 531, 17 Atl. 878 (1889); Commonwealth v. Reedy, 21 Pa. D. & C. 524 (Quarter Sess. 1933). A presentment
resulting from charges by individual witnesses will not stand. Commonwealth v.
Green,
supra.
24
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hurd, 177 Pa. 481, 35 AtI. 682 (1896).
2
5 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Klein, 40 Pa. Super. 352 (1909).
26
Case of Lloyd & Carpenter, 3 Clark 188, 192 (Pa. Quarter Sess. 1845).
27
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hurd, 177 Pa. 481, 35 Ad. 682 (1896) ; Commonwealth v. Rhey, 140 Pa. Super. 340, 14 A.2d 192 (1940).
28 A presentment resulting from testimony of witnesses before a special investigative grand jury must be within the scope of the subject matter investigated or
emanate from the personal knowledge of the jurors. Thus, an indictment of a police
officer for assault and battery was quashed where the grand jury was convened to
investigate graft and corruption in a police department Commonwealth v. Soloff,
175 Pa. Super. 423, 107 A.2d 179 (1954).
29 324 Pa. 48, 187 Atl. 498 (1936).
30 Id. at 60, 187 Adt. at 504. "A grand jury's investigation cannot be a blanket
inquiry to bring to light supposed grievances or wrongs ...

"

Id. at 61, 187

Atl. at 504.
81 Id. at 60-61, 187 At. at 504. "The grand jury is an arm of the criminal court
and criminal acts alone must be the foundation of its deliberations. . . . Unless
specifically authorized by the legislature, the grand jury has no power to hear any
matter that does not lead to criminal prosecution .

.

.

."

Id. at 58-59, 187 At. at

503. Accord, Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceeding (No. 1), 332
Pa. 289, 2 A.2d 789 (1938).
32 324 Pa. at 61, 187 AtI. at 504.
331bid.
34 Ibid.
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tion." 35 It is in line with these standards that the petition here in issue
was held defective for failure to allege either an emergency of the requisite
gravity or an incapacity of regular law enforcement agencies. General
allegations to these effects were declared inadequate to meet the requirements of "pleaded facts." 36 And, while the door was left open for a future
grand jury investigation "if the situation worsens," 37 the district attorney's
request for leave to amend the petition was denied since "if the situation
were so urgent and so dreadful as to require the intervention of a grand
jury, the petition would write itself." 38
In fact, until the present, every Pennsylvania appellate decision applying the criteria articulated in McNair has been concerned with corruption
of public office, involving corrupt practices either on the part of or directed
at public officials or persons charged with the performance of a public
duty.3 9 The doctrines developed within this body of precedent and tailored
35 Ibid.
36 Instant case at 256, 154 A.2d at 594.
37 Id. at 260, 154 A.2d at 596.
38 Id.at 261, 154 A.2d at 596. While it is clear that Pennsylvania grand jury
investigations cannot be instituted to discover or expose activity or "conditions,"
Grand Jury Investigation of Western State Penitentiary, 173 Pa. Super. 197, 96 A.2d
189 (1953), or even "corruption," Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation Case,
347 Pa. 316, 32 A.2d 199 (1943) ; McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 At. 498 (1936),
which if existent would not be criminally indictable, there remains some question
as to what constitutes sufficient basis for belief in the existence of indictable activity
to sustain a judicial order convening an investigative grand jury. Where the acts
of public officials sought to be investigated appear to be no more than neglect of
duty or oversight, mere speculation that such conduct may amount to wilful neglect
or refusal in bad faith to perform a duty, criminally actionable, will not support a
grand jury charge. Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation Case, supra.
On the other hand, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has gone so far as to require
from the district attorney, in a proposed investigation into corrupt practices in
connection with an election campaign, an amended petition alleging not only the
parties to the suspected violations, but the time and place of the alleged transactions. Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceeding (No. 1), 332 Pa.
289, 2 A.2d 783 (1938). "There must be, in the opinion of the District Attorney
and the court, evidence on hand of actual crime sufficient to promise the assurance
of one conviction for each of the particular offenses charged." Id. at 306-07, 2
A.2d at 792. As aptly pointed out by the dissent in a subsequent case, "To hold
that a court cannot order a grand jury investigation unless the offenses and
the offenders are identified in advance is exactly tantamount to a decision that
grand jury investigations should be ordered only when they have no purpose to
serve. When the offense and the offenders are known it is time to swear out
warrants. What the majority now prescribes as conditions precedent to a grand
jury investigation have been for ages the fruits of grand jury investigations." Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation Case, supra at 337-38, 32 A.2d at 209
(dissent). It is submitted that the "trustworthy information" test of McNair, 324
Pa. at 61, 187 Atl. at 504, is best suited to the purposes of grand jury investigation
and should be controlling.
89 Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation Case, supra note 38; Dauphin
County Grand Jury Investigation Proceeding (No. 1), supra note 38; McNair's Petition, supra note 38; Commonwealth v. Hurd, 177 Pa. 481, 35 Atl. 682 (1896);
Commonwealth v. Soloff, 175 Pa. Super. 423, 107 A.2d 179 (1954); Grand jury
Investigation of Western State Penitentiary, supra note 38; Commonwealth v.
Haines, 171 Pa. Super. 362, 90 A.2d 842 (1952); Commonwealth v. Rhey, 140 Pa.
Super. 340, 14 A.2d 192 (1940) ; Commonwealth v. Klein, 40 Pa. Super. 352 (1909) ;
Commonwealth v. Dietrich, 7 Pa. Super. 515 (1898). One lower court case, Charge
to the Grand Jury, 56 Lackawanna Jurist 177 (Pa. Quarter Sess. 1955), however
involved labor unions. The court's convening of the special grand jury was not
appealed.
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to it, while not in terms so limited, seem almost to preclude the utilization
of the investigative grand jury for inquiry into private criminal activity.
The instant case reveals how difficult a test the Pennsylvania rules oppose
to cases of non-government-connected action. It suggests, by contrast, that
the courts may well incline to view this particular "extraordinary mode"
as restricted in its primary function as a device for the uncovering of public
ministerial corruption. 40 Indeed the third of the McNair prerequisites,
that the suspected criminal activity "seriously affect or injure the public
generally," 41 a requirement that it affect not merely individuals, 42 nor
merely the social conscience of the people,4 3 but "public business, safety or
health, or . . . these functions of a widespread nature, jeopardizing or
demoralizing public security," 44 would seem prima facie fulfilled once it
is ascertained that the activity to be investigated is directed at or has taken
45
place within an organization whose function it is to serve the public.
By the very nature of the governmental institution, cases of crime within
its sphere of operation will ordinarily be cases "where the public, as a public,
in contradistinction from individuals who can do their own prosecuting,
is concerned." 46 Where private criminal activity is in question, on the
other hand, the burden of showing general public detriment would seem
enormous. 47 Even more significantly, the sixth McNair criterion-inade40 "The District Attorney does not allege in his petition that crimes were
committed by the guards of the Western State Penitentiary or by any of those
charged with the management of the institution; the allegation of criminal acts is
limited to inmates or prisoners confined therein. . . . [T]he District Attorney
admitted that he had no knowledge or suspicion of any crimes committed by anyone connected with the management, operation, or administration of the penitentiary."
Grand Jury Investigation of Western State Penitentiary, supra note 39, at 203, 96
A.2d at 191-92.
41324 Pa. at 61, 187 Atl. at 504.
42 See examples given in Case of Lloyd & Carpenter, 3 Clark 188, 192 (Pa.
Quarter Sess. 1845).
43

Ibid.

44 324 Pa. at 60-61, 187 At]. at 504.
45
Thus, where the matter investigated involves criminal activities in connection
with the giving of public contracts, Commonwealth v. Hurd, 177 Pa. 481, 35 Atl. 682
(1896), bribery of public officials, Commonwealth v. Klein, 40 Pa. Super. 352 (1909),
criminal neglect of duty by city magistrates, McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 At.
498 (1936), or a registration commission, Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation Case, 347 Pa. 316, 32 A.2d 199 (1943), embracery of the members of a 240man jury panel about to be drawn for the trial of cases involving fraudulent violations of the election laws, Commonwealth v. Rhey, 140 Pa. Super. 340, 14 A.2d
192 (1941), or collusion between a police department and organized crime, Commonwealth v. Haines, 171 Pa. Super. 362, 90 A.2d 842 (1952), it is clear that the
general public interest is affected.
46
Commonwealth v. Hurd, supra note 45, at 484, 35 At. at 682.
47 Although the frequently quoted language of Lloyd & Carpenter-"greatriots
that shake the social fabric, carrying terror and dismay among the citizens; general
public nuisances affecting the public health and comfort; multiplied and flagrant vices
tending to debauch and corrupt the public morals and the like" (3 Clark at 192)has been held merely illustrative (Commonwealth v. Hurd, supra note 46; Commonwealth v. Dietrich, 7 Pa. Super. 515 (1898)), it has been so held, and the language
has since been applied, in cases involving public office or duty. And not only does
the instant court apply to the petition before it a test articulated in large part
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quacy of the ordinary processes of law-is virtually presumptively satisfied in cases of public corruption, 48 whether through direct contaminating conflict of interest of the enforcing agency or through reluctance of one
administrative group to crack down on another. But it will seldom be
discovered in instances of individual, not governmental, crime. Indeed,
with the enormous expansion of state and especially of federal regulatory
legislation, it seems very unlikely that any criminal action of significant
enough impact to meet the third McNair criterion-and which is also conspiratorial or systematic under the fourth-will not today be immunized
from Pennsylvania grand jury investigation by failure to meet the no-otherprocesses-capable test.49 In connection with this possible distinction between
government-centered and wholly-private crime as regards their respective
susceptibility to investigative grand jury processes, note should be taken
that support exists for the proposition that some relaxation of ordinary
modes of criminal procedure is legitimate where crimes involving public
office are concerned. Commonwealth v. Hurd,50 holding proper a grand
jury investigation into alleged violation of conflict-of-interest legislation,
finds support in reasoning from the Pennsylvania constitution: 51 "It seems
to be a significant circumstance . . . that persons charged with misdemeanor in office . . . by the language of section 10 of the [Pennsyl-

vania] bill of rights, are deprived of certain rights accorded to other accused persons." 52 If such considerations have indeed been operative in
fashioning the rules permitting grand jury investigation of crime affecting
the general public, 53 the Pennsylvania courts would understandably be
through quoted phrases from this Lloyd & Carpenter passage (instant case at 256-57,
154 A.2d 594) but its own exemplary language seems little more than an updating
of the same conception: "the prevention, actual or threatened, of the supply of food
or milk, the destruction of perishables, the disruption of the flow of raw materials
and basic commodities to the city, or a breakdown of transportation, a stranding of
the working population, or rioting." Instant case at 259-60, 154 A.2d at 595.
48 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Haines, 171 Pa. Super. 362, 90 A.2d 842 (1952).
49 The instant court seems to regard the possible availability against the union
of § 501(b) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29
U.S.C. § 501(b), U.S. CODE CoNG & AD. Nzws 2975 (Sept. 14, 1959)), as such
an other adequate remedy as will foreclose investigative grand jury proceedings.
Instant case at 260, 154 A.2d at 595-96. It is doubtful that the McNair court
would have regarded federal prosecutorial processes invoked in aid of federal
penal law as ordinary law enforcement means within the meaning of its stated
rules. For the pervasiveness of federal criminal control over activity which would
also be punishable at state law-apart from the penal provisions attached to various
of the larger federal regulatory schemes-consider, e.g., the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (1958).
80 177 Pa. 481, 35 Atl. 682 (1896).
51
"No person shall, for any indictable offense, be proceeded against criminally
by information, except . . . by leave of the court for oppression or misdemeanor
in office." PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 10. For other constitutional provision encouraging
by special procedure prosecution of crimes connected with public office cf. PA.
CONST. art. III,§ 32 (self-incrimination exception with immunity provision).
52 177 Pa. at 483, 35 Atl. at 682.
53 "Possibly," the Hurd opinion continues following its citation of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision

relied on, "the motive actuating
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such
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allowance was twofold; first, that the offense concerned and affected the public at
large; second, the offense might be of such a character as to affect no individual as an
individual, hence it was unlikely that any single individual would be at the trouble
of bringing a prosecution." Id. at 484, 35 Atl. at 682.
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reluctant to extend those rules to include inquiries into non-governmental
crime.
Apart from the application of the McNair requirements, the instant
case presents an important procedural problem. Most of the cases involving challenges to the convention of inquisitorial grand juries are decided
on appeal from denial of a motion to quash an indictment. 54 Four cases,
however, including the instant case, have granted writs of prohibition
terminating the proceeding either before commencement of or during the
investigation.55 A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ, directing
the termination of a judicially sanctioned proceeding, normally granted only
in cases involving such action on the part of a lower court as will amount
to proceeding outside that court's jurisdiction. 56 Jurisdiction, for this
purpose, is used in the limited sense of competence over the subject matter
and persons involved, rather than in the sense of the aggregate of all those
factors which will determine the propriety of a court's action in a proceeding where it has such competence.57 Thus, the writ is not used to review
abuse of discretion. Unlike the three previous cases, however, the instant
court did not grant the writ either on the ground that the district attorney's
petition failed to allege the existence of criminal activity, or on the ground
that the persons involved were outside the lower court's territorial jurisdiction; 58 it in fact admitted that these two requirements were satisfied.
The court, rather, terminated the investigation on grounds that the allegations failed to show a sufficiently substantial effect on the public and an
inadequacy of ordinary law enforcement process. Moreover, the court
54

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hurd, 177 Pa. 481, 35 At. 682 (1896); Com-

monwealth v. Rhey, 140 Pa. Super. 340, 14 A.2d 192 (1940).

55 Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation Case, 347 Pa. 316, 32 A.2d 199

(1943); Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceeding (No. 1), 332 Pa. 289,
2 A.2d
783 (1938) ; McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 AtI. 498 (1936).
56

See, e.g., Ex parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68 (1877) ; Carpentertown Coal & Coke
Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426 (1948).

57 Ex parte Pennsylvania, 109 U.S. 174 (1883) ; Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n
v. Welsh, 188 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1951); In re Eastman Kodak, 48 F.2d 125 (3d Cir.
1931); Commonwealth v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 360 Pa. 103, 61 A.2d 430
(1948); Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, supra note 56.
58
Instant case at 259, 154 A.2d at 595. The other three Pennsylvania cases
granting writs of prohibition terminating grand jury investigations appear to have
been decided on these grounds. In McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 Ati. 498 (1936),
an attempted inquiry into the magistrate system in Pittsburgh was terminated on the
ground that "neither the district attorney nor the grand jury under such conditions

[as alleged in the judge's charge to the jury] could impose criminal liability." Id. at
63, 187 Atl. at 505. See 35 MicH. L. REv. 1018, 1020 (1937), where it is said that
McNair "may easily be explained as an attempt to order investigation of noncriminal matters." Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 1),
332 Pa. 289, 300-01, 2 A.2d 783, 789 (1938), reasoned: "There is not a single allegation
in any of the eight charges of the time when, and the place where, the alleged
violations of law were committed. There is no suggestion that any one was committed within the jurisdiction of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Dauphin County!'

(Emphasis added.) And Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation Case, 347
Pa. 316, 32 A.2d 199 (1943), followed McNair, finding insufficient allegation that the
conduct sought to be investigated constituted criminally indictable behavior. Thus,
the instant case is the only Pennsylvania decision terminating a grand jury investigation which cannot be explained on "jurisdictional" grounds.
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allowed that if the situation worsened to the extent that these two McNair
requirements were met, a determination could be made-a determination
which would seem to be "discretionary" rather than "jurisdictional"-that
the investigation was warranted.5 9 In granting this extraordinary writ, the
court may appear to invite the danger of a multiplicity of appellate-tribunal
litigation on matters normally subject to review only by appeal from denial
of a motion to quash,60 a procedure allowing reexamination of the inferior
court's action covering in detail all alleged errors up to the time of arraignment. 61 On the other hand, this use of the writ is more expedient in that
it prevents the delay and expense attendant upon participation throughout
an investigation unwarranted ab initio. Thus, the writ of prohibition would
seem to be the most efficient means of protection from unlawful grand jury
investigation initiated as a result of abuse of lower court discretion.
69

Instant case at 260, 154 A.2d at 596.
60 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10, 42 Atl. 374 (1899) ; Phillips v.
Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 197 (1863); Commonwealth v. Allison, 132 Pa. Super. 606,
1 A.2d 920 (1938); Commonwealth v. Hackney, 117 Pa. Super. 519, 178 Atl. 417
(1935); Commonwealth v. Haines, 57 Pa. Super. 616 (1914).
61 See cases cited note 60 supra.

